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The Model Cities Program (1966-1972) was a federal initiative to improve livelihoods in American cities 
by channeling federal funding into their most blighted neighborhoods.  Forty years later, the data is 
available to evaluate the program’s long-term effects.  Utilizing a difference-in-differences approach and 
decennial U.S. Census data, I find that the Model Cities Program had very little impact on many of its 
targeted areas.  Nonetheless, it appears that the program did reduce outmigration from the most blighted 
areas of target cities, when compared to cities that did not receive funding.   
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1.  Overview 
Economists have long debated the relative merits of federal “place-based” policies, those policies 
that allocate funds to particular declining geographic areas, and more traditional “people-based” policies, 
which grant funding to citizens based entirely on personal need, for economic development.  On the one 
hand, place-based policies can create efficiency losses by providing incentives for citizens to remain in, or 
move to, declining areas, rather than moving to higher-productivity areas.  For this reason, some 
economists believe that the federal government should avoid place-based policies entirely, and instead 
base all federal allocations on direct citizen need.  Other economists, however, argue that place-based 
policies fulfill societal demand, because individuals have heterogeneous preferences for places and 
therefore are unlikely to make location decisions based on government subsidies. 
In this paper, I empirically evaluate a particular place-based policy, the Model Cities Program 
(1966-1974).  The Model Cities Program was a federal initiative to reduce blight in urban centers across 
the United States.  It was a two-level place-based strategy.  First, the program selected 150 particular 
cities nation-wide to receive funding.  Second, each of those cities was required to select a model 
neighborhood area within its borders to which to direct all of its federal aid.  My paper contributes to the 
empirical literature on the Model Cities Program by analyzing the effect of the program at both the 
neighborhood level and city level along several variables related to the goals outlined in the Model Cities 
legislation.  For the first empirical section of this paper, I use model neighborhood maps from ten Model 
Cities and U.S. Census data from 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 to make tract-level comparisons between 
model neighborhoods and surrounding areas along population, retention rate, and several key variables 
related to the founders’ stated goals.  Using a difference-in-differences approach, I find that the program 
did not positively affect model neighborhoods relative to surrounding areas in terms of most of the 
founders’ stated goals, with the exception of education.  Moreover, I find that model neighborhoods lost 
population at a faster rate than surrounding tracts.  I also extend my analysis to model cities for which I 
was unable to obtain neighborhood maps, under the assumption that cities chose to establish model 
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neighborhoods in places with high poverty and vacancy rates and low housing values and education rates.  
I find similar results in the larger sample to the original group of ten mapped cities. 
The second empirical section in this paper draws city-level comparisons between model cities and 
cities that did not receive funding through the program. For that section, I use a propensity score matching 
strategy and data related to political representation, rioting history, demographics, and War on Poverty 
funding history to create a comparison group of cities that did not receive funding.  Then, using data from 
the 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 Census, I make difference-in-differences comparisons between model 
cities and the comparison group along the same variables studied in the first empirical section.  I find that 
model cities did not fare better by virtue of being selected into the program than other cities with similar 
baseline characteristics.  In fact, they saw larger increases, on average, in their poverty rates than cities in 
the comparison group.  However, when I combine my methods to make comparisons between blighted 
neighborhoods and surrounding tracts between model cities and the comparison group, I find that model 
neighborhoods were better able to retain their populations than the most blighted neighborhoods of cities 
that did not receive Model Cities funds.  These results suggest that the program did create an incentive for 
residents of model neighborhoods not to move, even though that incentive was not directly uncovered in 
any of the variables under study. 
Finally, this paper offers some possible interpretations of these results in terms of the place-based 
policy debate.  The results from my study neither wholly support the notion that place-based policies are 
inherently inefficient nor the contention that they address societal demands related to heterogeneous 
preferences with regard to location.  Rather, my study suggests that the program was mostly unable to 
achieve its lofty aims, and for this reason its implications for future place-based policies are nebulous. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 presents a historical overview of the 
program.  In section 3, I offer a brief review of the relevant literature.  Section 4 presents within-city 
difference-in-differences comparisons between model neighborhoods and surrounding areas.  Section 5 
describes the methodology and results of a second, across-city analysis resting on a matching strategy.  




2. Historical Overview 
The Model Cities Program originated as a solution to urban violence and blight and as a response 
to disillusionment with the proliferation of bureaucracy associated with Great Society programs. In 
October 1965, President Johnson appointed a “Task Force on Urban Problems,” chaired by Robert Wood, 
Head of the Political Science Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to address these 
issues. In December of the same year, the task force came back with a report recommending that the 
government create a five-year experimental program that would concentrate and coordinate existing 
government activities on the most blighted neighborhoods of urban areas. The Demonstration Cities and 
Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 is largely based on recommendations made in this report. The 
legislation was billed as a solution to urban violence, which aided its passage through Congress. 
The Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 laid out a somewhat vague 
outline of goals for the program. The legislation allocated $924 million to the program’s implementation, 
and assigned Secretary Weaver and the Department of Housing and Urban Development bureaucratic 
responsibility over these funds. The final law lists diverse aims, including “to expand housing, job, and 
income opportunities; to reduce dependence on welfare payments; to improve educational facilities and 
programs; to combat disease and ill health; to reduce the incidence of crime and delinquency; to enhance 
recreational and cultural opportunities; to establish better access between houses and jobs; and generally 
to improve living conditions.”  According to one analyst, “This diversity occurred because there was no 
one commanding causal theory of the urban situation, nor even agreement as to which problems were 
most significant” (Haar, 1975).  The legislation did not prioritize any one of its goals over others, nor did 
it allocate specific quantities of federal funds to any one of them. Rather, Congress gave HUD the 
authority to select 150 cities and to advance the projects associated with each selected city’s requests.  
Figure 1 illustrates the variety of ways that cities used Model Cities funds. 
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Before the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 even passed into 
law, HUD began to receive grant applications from prospective cities.  The Washington Interagency 
Review Committee, which had representatives from the Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and 
Welfare and the Office of Economic Opportunity, reviewed applications in a process known as the 
Planning Grant Review Project (PGRP). HUD developed an intricate selection process by which to rate 
cities and choose those that would most likely produce positive results with their funding.  On November 
6, 1966, HUD announced the 63 cities selected into the program. Most U.S. cities with populations over 
1,000,000 residents were included in this group. In March 1967, HUD added 12 more cities to the list. A 
second round of review occurred the following year (offering those cities who were not selected a chance 
to revise their proposals) and rewards for 72 more cities were announced in autumn 1968. 
During the review process, HUD instituted a rule that cities must designate model neighborhoods 
that consisted of no more than 15,000 people or 10% of the population, whichever was larger.  City 
governments tended to choose the highest-density, highest-need areas, but neighborhoods were selected 
for political reasons as well.  In some model cities, the government designated a few areas that 
collectively only covered about 15,000 people or 10% of the population. 
Secretary Weaver established the Model Cities Administration in early 1967 to administer the 
program. HUD’s regional offices took responsibility over operations and technical assistance to cities. At 
the local level, cities in competition for funding from HUD were instructed by the department to create 
City Demonstration Agencies (CDA) in order to involve citizens in the planning process.  As Frieden and 
Kaplan (1975) explain, a CDA was to be a public agency “closely related to the governmental decision-
making process in a way that permits the exercise of leadership by responsible elected officials.”  Each 
city had to strike a balance between citizen participation and reliance on government officials.   
In December 1967, in order to improve coordination across federal agencies, HUD, the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Department of Labor, and the Office of Economic 
Opportunities came to an Interagency Agreement. Thereafter the Washington Interagency Committee, 
chaired by Assistant Secretary Taylor, made policy decisions regarding the program. The Interagency 
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Agreement also established Regional Interagency Coordinating Committees, which were to provide 
technical assistance and oversee operations at the local level. 
At the start of the Nixon Administration, the president set up a Task Force on Model Cities, 
chaired by Edward Banfield of Harvard. His report, “Model Cities: A Step toward the New Federalism” 
gave a lukewarm review of the program and recommended that it be continued yet simplified. In the 
following years, twenty cities that had performed well were selected for “planned variations”, which were 
opportunities to extend model neighborhood boundaries or to implement federal recommendations on 
local program plans. In January 1973 the White House suspended a number of HUD programs and 
announced the suspension of Model Cities funding as of June 30, 1973. Model Cities funding, it was 
announced, would be replaced with revenue-sharing funds for community development that were 
expected to receive approval by Congress.  The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 
consolidated the Model Cities Program, urban renewal, and HUD community development programs. It 
replaced them with block grants for community development. Model cities were guaranteed enough from 
block grants to complete five years of projects, in accordance with average spending from past years. 
 
3. Literature Review 
3.1 Literature on Model Cities 
 Following Rubin (1994), the Model Cities Program focused on three objectives: the concentration 
of available resources in high-need areas, coordination of social service efforts across agencies and levels 
of government, and mobilization of citizens and local political leaders in the planning process. Most of 
the previously published studies of the Model Cities Program evaluate its success in either mobilizing 
citizen participation or coordinating efforts across agencies and levels of government.   
 The literature on citizen participation is generally commentary based on surveys and qualitative 
interviews of those persons involved in the planning and implementation of the program on both the 
federal and local level.  Several papers describe the beneficial aspects of citizen participation and the 
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failures of local governments to adequately involve citizens in the decision-making process (Strange, 
1972; Hallman, 1972; Weissman, 1978; Aleshire, 1972; Kloman, 1972).  Still other observers have 
commented that citizen participation could hinder comprehensive planning (Marshall Kaplan, Gans, and 
Kahn, 1970) and cost planning boards time and money (Judson, 1972).  In a sample of nine model cities, 
Warren (1969) finds that disputes between neighborhood residents and city hall over control of Model 
Cities funding often overshadowed community development goals.  Kloman (1972) describes the legal 
battle between Philadelphia’s citizens’ council and municipal government, offering further support for 
Warren’s conclusions.    Douglass (1973) creates an index to determine whether health programs funded 
through Model Cities are shaped more by the providers of healthcare or the consumers.  He finds that 
providers’ attitudes regarding citizen participation are highly associated the end provider-consumer 
orientation of the programs. Another line of research closely linked to the work on citizen participation 
assesses the effectiveness of Model Cities programming in addressing the claims of minority residents 
(Hetzel, 1971).  Harrison (1974) finds that cities with more developed bureaucracies and stronger mayors 
were more likely to violate federal guidelines requiring them to hire residents of model neighborhood 
areas, and that overall there was racial discrimination in hiring for Model Cities projects. 
 The Model Cities Program has also served as a test of political theories related to the coordination 
of programs between local agencies and across local, state, and federal levels of government (Grumm and 
Murphy, 1974; Terrell, 1980; Foster, 1978).  Sundquist and Davis (1969) posit that the Model Cities 
Program improved coordination among agencies at the federal and local level over previous urban 
rehabilitation efforts, and that the bureaucratic structure of the Model Cities Program should be preserved 
and expanded to other cities and to rural areas.  In contrast, Warren (1973) argues that the coordination 
aspect of the Model Cities Program offered an “aura of change without affecting either the causes of 
poverty or the basic injustices in the social system.”  These findings are based on qualitative accounts of 
Model Cities and political theory, not on quantitative methods. 
 Rich (1989) and Gilbert and Specht (1974) produce quantitative studies of the dissemination of 
federal funds to city governments through the Model Cities Program.  Rich’s work uses multivariate 
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regression analysis to determine whether politics, community needs, local demand and prior federal 
program grants influenced federal decisions about funding allocation.  He finds that recipient jurisdictions 
had agency in determining how federal funding was distributed, but that political influence in Congress 
did not affect Model Cities funding levels.  In their 1974 study, Gilbert and Specht find that the federal 
government was unsuccessful in “picking winners” – cities that would accomplish the program’s aims - 
by comparing Planning Grant Review Project (PGRP) ratings assigned by federal staff to grant applicants 
to city-level performance indicators.  These indicators include the degree of citizen participation in the 
planning process and the overall quality of each city’s first year plan, as rated on a survey of HUD 
officials.  Their paper does not analyze specific livelihood outcomes among the target cities’ populations, 
but it does compare PGRP ratings to first-year program expenditures for service delivery, because more 
highly organized cities were able to spend more of their allocated funding. 
Generally published studies do not assess the program’s results against the founders’ stated goals 
for rehabilitation of the most blighted areas of the city.  Instead, scholars focus on the process of 
addressing these needs.  For example, Gonzalez and Woodward (1974) conduct a case study of the health 
assistants program in Laredo-Webb County, Texas.  They describe the broad, multipurpose role of health 
assistants in the community and then conclude that a health assistants program is an effective strategy for 
providing health services to the community.  Their study describes a program and suggests that it can be 
used as a model for future healthcare initiatives, but they do not evaluate the effect of the program on 
overall community health.  Another example of this process-focus comes from Taylor and Williams 
(1967), who wrote about the legal aspects of the Model Cities Program during its early years.  They 
theorize that the new laws will address the need for low and moderate income housing, but their paper 
was written too soon to evaluate the impact of the law on that program area.   
This paper contributes a comprehensive empirical evaluation of the impacts of Model Cities on 
the livelihoods of residents to the literature. I analyze the effects of the program on a wide breadth of 
variables, including population levels, racial composition, and retention rates; the use of public 
transportation and the distance between jobs and homes; high school graduation rates; poverty rates, 
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income, and welfare rates; and house values and rents.  Moreover, this paper documents how the 
concentration of federal resources into model neighborhoods affected both model neighborhoods 
specifically and model cities at large.  In doing so, this paper addresses the under-studied first objective of 
Model Cities (Rubin, 1994). 
 
3.2 Literature on place-based policies 
 The economics debate over place-based policies can be traced back to Winnick (1966), who 
coined the phrase “place prosperity vs. people prosperity” and offered several arguments for why place-
based policies are necessarily ineffective redistribution schemes.  Winnick argues that these policies 
always boost particular geographic places at the expense of other high-need areas, and that by targeting 
particular places, governments allow citizens who do not demonstrate need to reap the benefits of their 
programs.  He cautions against over-selling place-based policies and miscalculating their benefits.  In 
contrast, Clark (1983) purports that place-based policies can effectively redistribute resources.  He 
opposes government’s emphasis on complete efficiency, arguing instead for income support to offer 
citizens the choice not to move.  Similarly, Bolton (1992) argues that “sense of place” is an intangible but 
valuable asset with important externalities that should be taken into account in designing federal and 
regional policy.   
Recently, economists have taken a renewed interest in the conditions under which place-based 
policies can and cannot be efficient.  They have improved the models for understanding how place-based 
policies affect migration, wages, and rents.  For example, Glaesar and Redlick (2008) present a theoretical 
argument showing that place-based policies will only increase societal welfare if social capital already 
limits out-migration from areas in decline.  Using data from the General Social Survey regarding group 
membership, which they use as a proxy for social capital, they find empirically that the prospect of 
outmigration does not influence investment in social capital in declining areas, and thereby conclude that 
place-based policies are inefficient.   Kline (2010) theorizes that place-based policies can be efficient 
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when location preferences are idiosyncratic.  That is, if preferences for location (of both work and 
residence) are heterogeneous, then place based policies will not create a strong incentive to stay in or 
move to low productivity areas, the deadweight loss from place-based policies should be small.  On the 
other hand, if individuals have identical or nearly identical preferences, then place-based policies will 
result in large population shifts towards low-productivity areas, and losses to inefficiency should be large.   
In an empirical study, Busso, Gregory, and Kline (2010) focus on quantifying the effects of the 
Empowerment Zones (EZ) Program of the 1990s on job creation and wages.  They use Census data and 
information from the Longitudinal Business Database and a difference-in-differences strategy to compare 
empowerment zones to areas that were nominated to the program but did not receive EZ grants. They find 
that the program increased employment and generated wage increases for residents of empowerment 
zones.  Next, based on a model that shows that deadweight loss can be approximated based on a set of 
reduced form elasticities in the job and housing markets, they find that deadweight loss is equal to about 
seven percent of the flow cost of the subsidy.  Because the Empowerment Zones initiative focused 
exclusively on job creation, the Busso, Gregory and Kline paper is limited in scope.  The authors did not 
test the impact of place-based policies to improve education, healthcare, housing, and other amenities on 
migration patterns to and from target areas.   
One test of a place-based policy that did address needs outside of job creation is Collins and 
Shester’s (2010) empirical investigation of the Urban Renewal Program, an initiative that overlapped both 
in purpose and chronologically with Model Cities.  Using the year that program-enabling legislation was 
passed in each state as an instrumental-variable, the authors estimate the total federal grants approved 
through the program.  They then use Census data and their grant estimates to find that federal Urban 
Renewal spending improved city-level outcomes such as income, property values, employment rate and 
poverty rate. Further, they find that displacement (that is, pricing out low income residents) does not drive 
these outcomes, and that the true cause of improvement was renewal and revitalization.   
Like Collins and Shester’s paper, and unlike the study by Busso, Gregory, and Kline, my paper 
will focus on improvements in livelihoods outside of job creation.  In evaluating changes in population 
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and retention rates alongside changes in education, housing, poverty rates, rents and welfare, I will 
measure how changes induced by the Model Cities Program affected migration from declining areas.  If 
preferences for location are highly heterogeneous despite changes in amenities, then changes in migration 
as a result of the program are likely to be small.  On the other hand, if individual preferences for location 
are nearly identical, then we would expect to see improvements in education, housing, and other factors to 
cause changes in population. 
 
4. Within-City Difference-in-Differences Analysis 
My first line of empirical study compares tracts that fall within model neighborhoods to tracts 
that surround those neighborhoods over time.   
 
4.1 Data and Sample 
Most data used in this analysis are tract-level panel data from the Decennial Census collected 
between 1970 and 2000 by the U.S Census Bureau and aligned by Census 2000 tract boundaries across 
years by Geolytics, Inc.  The data contain information for all tracts in the United States, a total of 65,442 
observations for each year.  The data include demographic variables, education information, rent 
measures, and other variables that the developers of the Model Cities Program hoped would be affected 
by their work.     
The primary sample is limited to tracts in those cities for which model neighborhood border 
descriptions or maps were readily available.  The complete sample consists of ten cities: San Diego, New 
Orleans, Boston, Minneapolis, St. Paul, Kansas City, St. Louis City, Asheville, Rock Hill, and Detroit.  
My strategy for procuring maps and border descriptions, which is described in more depth in the data 
appendix, resulted in a sample influenced by both the transparency of city governments and by my own 
location.  Those cities with more extensive electronic archives were more likely to make it into the 
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sample.  Detroit joined the sample only because Detroit city records were in archives in nearby Ann 
Arbor. 
The Gelolytics database also includes latitude and longitude coordinates for the central point in 
each census tract, which I use to extend my analysis to wider areas within each city (section 4.3.1) and to 
a larger sample of Model Cities (section 4.3.2).  
 
4.2 Empirical Specification and Strategy 
I use a difference-in-differences approach to estimate the effect of the Model Cities Program on 
model neighborhoods.  This approach capitalizes on the arbitrary decision by HUD staff to force cities 
applying for funding to designate a model neighborhood with less than 15,000 people or ten percent of the 
population, whichever was larger. 1
To evaluate the effect of the Model Cities Program on various urban outcomes, I estimate the 
following linear regression model: 
  It also accounts for baseline differences between model 
neighborhoods and surrounding tracts.  Both the model neighborhoods and comparison groups are 
expected to change over time along many variables, but because only tracts in the model neighborhoods 
received direct treatment from programs supported by Model Cities funding, estimates of the differences 
in these changes will reflect the effects of the program.   
(1)  𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝐷80𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝐷90𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝐷00𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐷𝐷80𝑖𝑖  + 𝛽𝛽5𝐷𝐷90𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽6𝐷𝐷00𝑖𝑖  +
𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   
where MN is coded 1 for all census tracts in model neighborhoods and 0 for all other tracts in the sample.2
                                                            
1 The 15,000-person or ten-percent limit was lifted shortly after Nixon took office, and some cities did choose to 
extend the programs supported by Model Cities to other neighborhoods.  However, by the time the restrictions were 
lifted, the first year action plans created my community governments and citizen organizations were already in 
place.  To the extent that these cities did extend the program, my treatment effects will be understated. 
  
I use two different strategies for dealing with the subset of 59 tracts that cross model neighborhood 
boundaries. In my main coding, I code MN equal to 1 for tracts with at least half of their geographic area 
2 The sample includes all tracts that are in model neighborhoods, bordering model neighborhoods, or touching tracts that border 
model neighborhoods in the sample of ten model cities.  In this coding, MN=0 if more than half of the tract’s area lies outside of 
the model neighborhood’s boundaries. 
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within the model neighborhood.  In an alternative coding, I set MN equal to 1 for tracts with more than 
half of their geographic area, and exclude tracts whose areas are approximately half-way in the model 
neighborhood from the sample.3
Table 1 shows baseline
 In a final coding, I code MN equal to 1 only for tracts that are entirely in 
the model neighborhood and touching the border, and set MN equal to 0 only for tracts that are entirely 
outside the neighborhood and touching the border.  Time dummies D80, D90, and D00 are coded 1 if the 
observation is for that year and 0 otherwise, so 1970 is the excluded group.  The vector 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖  includes tract 
fixed effects.  The interaction terms of MN and time dummies are of interest as they show how outcomes 
in model neighborhoods evolved over time.  
4
The first variables chosen for analysis should illustrate the effect of the program on migration to 
and from model neighborhoods.  These include total population, the number of households, retention rate, 
 differences on some key variables between comparison group tracts and 
tracts in the model neighborhood (the treated group) in the sample of ten well-documented cities.  The 
table reveals that, overall, the surrounding tracts were better off in 1970 than model neighborhood areas 
on a number of fronts.  Population density in surrounding tracts was much lower (about 4,700 fewer 
people per square mile) but the average number of households was not statistically significantly different 
than in the model neighborhood, which suggests that generally families had fewer children.  Moreover, 
the white proportion of the population was about 31 percentage points higher in surrounding tracts in 
1970 than in the model neighborhood.  Column 4 also shows that the poverty rate in surrounding tracts 
was about 8 percentage points lower than in the model neighborhood, and average income, which is 
closely related, was about $1420 higher.  The table suggests that the cities in my sample successfully 
included their poorest areas with the largest minority populations in their designated model 
neighborhoods, and that the 15,000-person or ten-percent cut-off did not force cities to leave out equally 
distressed segments of their populace from the program.   
                                                            
3 Figure 2 illustrates the original coding and first alternative coding of MN in Detroit, MI.  Those tracts in dark grey 
are reassigned in the alternative coding.   
4 1970 is chosen as the baseline year because, even though funding began to trickle into neighborhoods the year before, it is 
unlikely that any immediate effects could be seen along the outcome variables selected for analysis.  Moreover, 1970 is the first 
year for which census data harmonized to 2000 is available. 
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and the proportion of the population that is white.  Other outcome variables chosen for analysis directly 
measure the effectiveness of the program in achieving its aims.  In particular, changes in the proportion of 
workers using public transit and the proportion of workers working in their county of residence reflect the 
program’s effectiveness in establishing better access between homes and jobs.  The proportion of persons 
over 25 years of age who have graduated from high school is a measurement of the program’s success 
extending educational facilities and programs.  Changes in welfare rate reflect the program’s ability to 
reduce dependence on welfare.  Changes in poverty rate, average rent, average income, and average 
housing values are measures of the program’s success in expanding housing, job, and income 
opportunities and in generally improving living conditions.   
 
4.3 Results 
Results from these regressions are summarized in table 2.  Columns 1 and 2 of the table show 
that, although differences in changes in population and total number of households between 1970 and 
1980 were insignificant across groups, as time wore on, and population losses accrued across the board, 
model neighborhood tracts saw greater losses than surrounding areas.  Between 1970 and 2000, model 
neighborhood tracts lost about 45 percent of their population, while surrounding tracts lost only about 28 
percent.  This figure seems less dramatic when one considers that model neighborhoods only lost about 
one half percent more of their 1970 population per year than surrounding tracts over the thirty-year 
period.  Column 3 shows that the changes in retention rates were about the same in the two groups. 
The results summarized in table 2 do suggest, however, that the white population “fled” from 
surrounding tracts at a faster rate than from model neighborhoods.  While the white proportion of the 
population in surrounding tracts decreased by 26.4 percentage points between 1970 and 1990, model 
neighborhoods tracts saw losses about 9.5 percentage points smaller, for a total decrease in the white 
proportion of the population by only 16.9 percentage points. The reduction of white flight was not a stated 
aim of the program, but this result could imply that Model Cities improved relations between white and 
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minority residents in model neighborhoods.  It could also be that white, low-income residents benefitted 
more from the program than their minority counterparts.  This theory aligns with findings from Hetzel 
(1971) that the program did not adequately address the needs of minorities.  If it is the case that whites 
benefitted from the program more than minorities, then the reduction of white-flight suggests that the 
program did create small shifts in population and associated losses in efficiency. 
Column 5 shows that the drop in utilization of public transit over the thirty-year period covered 
by the data was 7.2 percentage points greater in model neighborhoods than in surrounding tracts.  One 
interpretation of this result is that workers ceased to use public transit because, as a consequence of 
outmigration from the city, they had to travel to jobs out of the range of public transit lines.  When jobs 
for low-income individuals are located in areas of the city (or the suburbs) where these individuals cannot 
afford homes, the city is said to be experiencing spatial mismatch.  This interpretation of the public transit 
result implies that spatial mismatch phenomenon plagued model cities despite attempts to bring jobs to 
low-income areas.  One would expect spatial mismatch to be associated with an increased proportion of 
workers working outside their county of residence.  However, Column 6 shows that the proportion of 
workers working in the county in which they reside decreased by about 8.4 percentage points overall 
between 1970 and 2000, but that residents of the model neighborhood did not account for this trend more 
than their counterparts in surrounding areas.   
An alternative, more optimistic interpretation of the public transit result is that model 
neighborhood residents increased their use of cars more than residents of surrounding areas because they 
became able to afford them.  However, column 8 shows that increases in the poverty rate during the same 
period were felt about equally by the two groups, with a difference across groups only seen by the year 
2000, when the change in the poverty rate is about 3.7 percentage points smaller in the model 
neighborhood than in surrounding tracts.  This cannot account for the difference in public transit rates ten 
and twenty years earlier. 
Columns 9 and 10 show that changes in welfare rates and average household income were not 
significantly different in model cities and surrounding areas between 1970 and later census years.  
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Housing values (column 11) also did not change significantly less or more in the model neighborhood 
tracts than in comparison group tracts, but average rents (column 12) increased by only 170 percent in 
model neighborhoods between 1970 and 1980, while they increased by about 260 percent in surrounding 
tracts.  This could be the result of losses in population, but it is also possibly a positive effect of the 
Model Cities Program, as one of the many aims of the program was to provide affordable housing to low-
income households, which are usually renters. 
Table 3 presents the results in table 1 side-by-side with results from my variations in coding of 
tracts that cross model neighborhood boundaries.  The table only includes coefficients from the 
interaction terms in the model because these are the variables of interest.  Columns 1, 4, and 7 have 
results from table 1.  For columns 2, 5, and 7, I exclude tracts with 50 percent of their area in model 
neighborhood boundaries (my baseline coding included these tracts in the model neighborhood group).  
Figure 2 illustrates this recoding.  Finally, in columns 3, 6, and 9, I exclude tracts that cross the model 
neighborhood boundaries entirely, so only tracts completely within the model neighborhood and touching 
the border are included in the treatment group and only tracts completely outside and touching the border 
are in the control group.  For both versions of recoding, general trends do not differ qualitatively from 
those in table 1.  Overall, the table shows that the results from table 2 are robust to slight changes in 
categorization of tracts into the “model neighborhood” and “surrounding tracts” groups.   
 
 4.3.1 Addressing Spillover 
Spillover effects could cause measurement error that would dilute the effects I estimate in my 
initial analysis.  It could be that the Model Cities Program had positive effects on the most blighted areas 
of the targeted cities, but that these effects were also felt in surrounding tracts.  If this were the case, the 
results presented in table 1 would underestimate the relative changes in my twelve outcome variables.  
One way to account for spillovers is to compare tracts within the model neighborhood to tracts farther 
away.  If spillover effects of the Model Cities Program were felt in tracts that immediately surround the 
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model neighborhood but were not felt in tracts farther away, then difference-in-differences estimates 
across time between tracts farther away and tracts in the model neighborhood should show stronger, 
positive effects of the program. 
Because average tract area varies across cities, adding another ring to the sample used in table 2 
would not create equivalent comparison groups across cities.  In some cities adding another ring to the 
sample would mean comparing the model neighborhood to areas miles away, while in others it would add 
an area of only a few more blocks in every direction to the comparison group.  To account for this, I 
create a new sample based on calculating the distance between census tracts and a central model 
neighborhood point. 
I select a central model neighborhood point using human approximation and a mapping program 
that returns the latitude and longitude coordinates of any point on the globe. 5
Table 4a shows the results of ordinary least squares estimates, with fixed effects for census tract, 
of the twelve key outcome variables on the new model neighborhood indicator variable.  Estimates from 
the table do suggest that the Model Cities Program had a positive effect on model neighborhoods in 
  In cities where model 
neighborhoods were in patches (such as New Orleans, which had three small areas near one another, and 
Kansas City, which had four) I select a point in the center of each portion of the model neighborhood.  I 
then calculate the minimum distance between the central point of every tract in the United States and the 
hand-selected central model neighborhood points.  I exclude tracts that are more than .1 latitude and 
longitude degrees (about 6.5 miles) from every hand-selected model neighborhood point from the sample.  
I find that the maximum distance between tracts within my initial comparison group and the central model 
neighborhood point is about .085 degrees (or about 5.52 miles), so I include tracts between .085 and .1 
degrees from the central model neighborhood point in my new comparison group.  In this recoding, the 
model neighborhood group remains the same.  It consists of all tracts whose areas are at least halfway 
inside the model neighborhood boundaries. 
                                                            
5 By looking at a neighborhood map, I estimated which street intersection was at the center of the model 
neighborhood.  Then I used itouchmap.com to find the latitude and longitude of that intersection.  Error in 
approximating the exact center of the model neighborhoods is unlikely to put bias on my results. 
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certain program areas relative to areas farther away.  Comparisons between 1970 and 1990 show that high 
school education rates in model neighborhoods increase by 3.3 percent more than in surrounding tracts 
and that average house value increased by 2.4 percent more in model neighborhoods than in surrounding 
tracts, even as population fell.  Comparisons between 1970 and 2000 show that model neighborhoods saw 
increases in poverty rates 5.3 percentage points smaller than comparison areas, and corresponding 
increases in income and decreases in welfare rates.  These results suggest that my initial estimates may 
have understated some positive effects.  However, if the Model Cities Program had actually improved 
housing, then the effects should have been seen earlier, as the program ended in the mid-seventies.  
Moreover, the estimate of larger improvements in education in model neighborhoods than in comparison 
areas might be due to the fact that comparison areas had high rates of high school education to begin with, 
and therefore had little room to improve.  The difference-in-differences strategy accounts for baseline 
differences, but it cannot compare changes in the treated group to how the untreated group would have 
improved had it had more uneducated people to instruct. 
Also, the table also shows that model neighborhoods and nearby tracts saw larger losses in 
population than the comparison groups in the 30 years following the program’s implementation.   They 
also saw no significant differences in changes in retention rate, poverty rate, and welfare rate over the first 
20 years.  These results strongly align with the initial estimates presented in table 2.  They imply that the 
Model Cities Program was ineffective in the twenty years following its implementation.   
Next, in order to compare how coefficient estimates differ between comparison groups chosen at 
varying distances from the model neighborhood, I estimate the following linear regression model: 
In particular, I estimate propensity scores based on the following probit model: 
(4) Pr(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 1| 𝒙𝒙) = Φ (𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖7𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖7𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟7𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠7𝑐𝑐   +
 𝛽𝛽5𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢7𝑐𝑐  + 𝛽𝛽6𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢68𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽10𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐)  
Where Pr denotes probability, Φ  is the Cumulative Distribution Function of the standard normal 
distribution, unemprt7 is the city’s unemployment rate in 1970; povrat7 is the proportion of the city’s 
population below the poverty line in 1970; shrblk7 is the proportion of the city’s population that is black 
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or African American in the same year; popdens7 is the city-wide population density in the same year; 
citypop7 is the total population of the city in the same year; votes is the total number of votes in support 
of the program by Congress members whose constituency includes city c; 6 7 dems is the number of 
members of Congress in the Democratic Party in 1966 whose constituency includes city c; federalgrants 
is the dollar amount of federal funding through Great Society programs to the county in which the city is 
located between 1965 and 1967; crimerate68 is the average monthly crime rate in the city in 1968; and 
riots is an index for intensity of 1960s race riots based on number of injuries, arrests, and other relevant 
factors.8
(2)  𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝐷80𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝐷80𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝐷80𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝐷90𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽5𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝐷90𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝐷90𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝐷00𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝐷00𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝐷0𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽10𝐷𝐷80𝑖𝑖  + 𝛽𝛽11𝐷𝐷90𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽12𝐷𝐷00𝑖𝑖  + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖    
 
In this model, MNa equals 0 if the tract is between .04 and .085 degrees from the center of the model 
neighborhood; MNb equals 0 if the tract is between .085 and .095 degrees from the center of the model 
neighborhood; and MNc equals 0 if the tract is between .095 and .1 degrees from the center of the model 
neighborhood.9  Otherwise, these variables are set equal to 1.  Hence, tracts within .04 degrees of the 
model neighborhood central point, are set equal to 1 in all three indicator variables, and the coefficients 
on the interaction terms show the relative difference between the model neighborhood area10
                                                            
6 If cities crossed congressional district boundaries but had identical political information in both districts, I included only one 
observation.  If they crossed congressional boundaries and the outcomes would be different if they were in one or the other, I 
included two observations.  If any of the observations matched into the data by the method described in section ten, they were 
included in the final sample. 
 and each 
comparison group’s change between baseline and later decades.  Table 4b shows the results from these 
7 The map of the 89th congressional district boundaries lacked some detail.  Some major metropolitan regions showed that several 
Congress members represented the same area, resulting in artificially high numbers of representative Democrats and votes.  
These cities were some of the largest in the country, though, so they were unlikely to have appropriate comparison cities. 
8 Many of these variables are for 1970, which is after cities were selected into the program.  However, 1970 is the nearest census 
year to 1967, when HUD began reviewing applications.  Much of this paper is written under the reasonable assumption that in 
1970 effects of Model Cities were not yet felt. 
9 MNb and MNc essentially break down the new comparison group into two component parts, while MNa includes many of the 
tracts in the comparison group from the initial table. 
10 In most of the ten cities for which I had model neighborhood maps, a circle with radius .04 degrees around the central model 
neighborhood point also included some tracts that were not within the model neighborhood.  Hence, in these cities, the new 





regressions.  In general, estimates of the effect of the program show stronger, negative differences in 
population and number of households when the comparison groups are farther away.  They show stronger 
reduction in welfare rates and increases in housing values when comparisons are made with groups 
farther away as well. 
Tables 2, 4a, and 4b tell much the same story.  In all cases, model neighborhoods saw losses in 
population relative to outside areas, and very small differences in changes in welfare rates and poverty 
rates. If anything, negative differences are stronger when comparing model neighborhood areas with areas 
farther away.   
It could be that positive externalities from the Model Cities Program were felt all over the city, in 
which case the strategy presented here does not adequately address spillover.  It could also be that, even 
though tracts in the model neighborhoods fared worse in the three decades after the program began than 
tracts in surrounding areas, these differences are smaller than they would have been in the absence of the 
program.  I address these possibilities in later sections.  First, however, I test whether the results from my 
initial analysis are externally valid.   
 
4.3.2 External Validity 
The ten cities within my “well-documented” sample only account for one fifteenth of the cities 
granted federal funding through the Model Cities Program.  It would be good to know whether the effects 
documented in the previous sections were also seen in the rest of the model cities, but, without maps or 
written accounts of where the model neighborhoods were located, documenting these effects necessitates 
predicting model neighborhood location.  Hence, with the knowledge that cities generally chose their 
most blighted neighborhoods as model neighborhoods, I created the following “model neighborhood 
index” using baseline 1970 data:  
 (3)  𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 = �
𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖
𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖
� + � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖
� +  �1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖





where povrat is the percentage of 1970 residents below the poverty line, vachu is the percentage of total 
housing units that are vacant, avval is average house value, and peduc12 is proportion of residents with at 
least a high school education.  In this index, i denotes a tract and c refers to a city.  So, for example, 
𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖  is the poverty rate for the city in which tract i is located.
11
In each of the 145 model cities for which I had appropriate data, including the ten cities in my 
initial sample, I assigned the central point of the tract with the highest model neighborhood index as the 
predicted central model neighborhood point.  I found that all of the tracts within the “well-documented” 
model cities were within .04 degrees of the hand-selected model neighborhood points described in the 
previous section, so I created a new variable, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀� , set equal to one for all tracts within .04 degrees of the 
predicted central model neighborhood point, and set equal to zero for all tracts within .085 and .1 degrees 
of the predicted central model neighborhood point. 
  The term  1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖
 is included as 
such in the index because one would expect cities to designate areas with low housing values, relative to 
the rest of the city, as model neighborhoods.  For similar reasons, I include 1−𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐 12𝑖𝑖
1−𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐 12𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖
 in the model.  It is 
the ratio of the proportion of the tract population over 25 years of age with less than twelve years of 
education and the proportion of the city population over 25 years of age with less than twelve years of 
education. 
The choice for the model neighborhood index was based on a comparison of my predicted model 
neighborhoods (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀� ) with the actual model neighborhoods (MN) in the ten cities for which I have model 
neighborhood maps. It was selected from among the 63 different possible combinations of the following 
six variables, all of which are associated with urban blight: average household income, average house 
value, percentage of total housing units that are vacant, poverty rate, proportion of the population that is 
not white, and percent of the population without a high school education.  The index used for this paper 
                                                            
11 In the Neighborhood Change Database, each census tract in an urban area also falls into a place (which roughly 
corresponds to a city), denoted by a 1998 FIPS place code.  To calculate 𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 , 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 , 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 , and 
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐12𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 , I aggregated the data by place code.  
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had the highest accuracy in assigning tracts to the same treatment and control groups to which they were 
assigned in the analysis described in the previous section.  
Nevertheless, I cannot know with certainty that the predicted model neighborhoods designated by 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�  were actually model neighborhoods selected by city governments and residents.  Hence, the results 
presented in tables 5a and 5b might best be understood as estimates of how well the most blighted areas in 
model cities performed in the thirty years following the implementation of the program, relative to 
surrounding areas.  Tables 5a and 5b show estimates for coefficients from the same regressions presented 
in tables 4a and 4b using the new 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�  variable.  If the results presented in tables 2, 3, 4a and 4b are 
externally valid, one would expect to see similar trends in tables 5a and 5b. 
In fact, many of the effects documented in tables 2, 4a, and 4b are also seen in the larger sample 
of model cities.  Like in the initial sample of well-documented cities, tracts in predicted model 
neighborhoods in the larger sample of model cities saw losses in population and number of households 
between 1970 and all three comparison years relative to tracts in the comparison group.  In terms of 
population, model neighborhoods lost 21.4 percent of their 1970 population by 2000, while comparison 
areas increased their population by about 7.5 percent.  At the same time, like in the initial sample, 
predicted model neighborhoods saw larger increases in their retention rates than comparison areas 
between 1970 and 1980 and between 1970 and 1990.  Like in the initial sample, the use of public transit 
decreased more in model neighborhoods than in comparison areas - by about 2.4 percentage points more 
when comparing 1970 and 2000 - while the proportion of workers whose jobs are in their county of 
residence showed no difference.  Finally, the high school education rate in predicted model 
neighborhoods improved more over time than in the comparison group.  This is consistent with results 
presented in tables 4a and 4b.   
In terms of poverty rate and welfare rate, however, predicted model neighborhoods in the larger 
sample of Model Cities saw significantly larger increases over the first 20 years than the comparison 
group.  In the well-documented sample, these differences were insignificant.  Moreover, the average 
household income in model neighborhoods and the average house values increased significantly less 
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between 1970 and all three comparison years than in comparison tracts.  In the mapped sample, these 
differences are also insignificant. 
The results presented in table 5a suggest that many of my initial estimates were externally valid.  
The most blighted areas in Model Cities saw losses relative to surrounding areas along several key 
outcome variables.  However, estimates in section 4.3.2 that show improvements in terms of poverty 
rates, welfare rates, and average income do not carry over to the larger sample.  This could point to either 
sample bias in the small sample or to inaccuracy in predicting model neighborhoods in the large sample.  
Either way, I cannot say with certainty from my estimates that the Model Cities Program made significant 
improvements along these dimensions. 
Finally, the results in table 5b are consistent with those presented in table 4b, in that comparisons 
with areas farther away from the center of the predicted model neighborhood show larger negative 
differences. 
Overall, the difference-in-differences analysis presented hear suggests that the Model Cities 
Program was unsuccessful in attaining many of its stated aims.  The exception appears to be education, 
where model neighborhoods did see significantly larger gains than surrounding areas.  With the exception 
of the “proportion white” result in table 2, the results do not suggest that the Model Cities Program 
increased migration to (or reduced outmigration from) model neighborhoods.  Rather, model 
neighborhoods lost more population relative to surrounding areas in the thirty years following the 
implementation of the program.  The evidence presented here neither supports nor weakens the theory 
that place-based policies create efficiency losses.  Because my results do not show large gains in model 
neighborhoods as a result of the program, it cannot be determined whether the program would have 




5.  Across-city Analysis Utilizing Propensity Matching 
I now move to a city-level analysis of the Model Cities Program.  Comparisons between model 
cities and cities that did not receive funding can provide additional insight into the effects of the program 
in at least two ways.  First, the founders of Model Cities theorized that their program to reduce blight in 
the worst urban neighborhoods would have positive externalities across target cities.  Thus, as previously 
mentioned, within-city comparisons between model neighborhoods and surrounding tracts may be biased 
by spillover effects.  Comparing city-wide outcomes is a second way to address spillover.  Second, it 
could be that model neighborhoods saw smaller losses along the twelve outcome variables under study 
relative to surrounding tracts than the most blighted neighborhoods in cities that did not receive funding.  
In section 5.3.1, I estimate these differences.   
 
5.1 Data 
Once again, my primary data source is the tract-level U.S. Census data harmonized across 1970, 
1980, 1990, and 2000 by Geolytics, Inc.  The database includes a 1998 FIPS place code for each census 
tract, which designates the city, town, or village in which the tract is located.  It does not include a place 
name, though, so I also use name data from the Social Explorer database to connect tract-level Geolytics 
data to city-level data from other sources.   To prepare the relevant outcome variables (and those variables 
in the matching model, below, that come directly from the 1970 census) I aggregate tract-level data by 
1998 census place code.   
To supplement this analysis, this study uses grant data on HUD supplemental grant allocations for 
the first year of operations, as of May 31, 1971, for each of the 150 model cities.  I use these values as a 
proxy for the value of total funds allocated to each of the cities under the Model Cities Program.  I also 
utilize county-level federal funding data from all War on Poverty programs between 1965 and 1967.  
I use political data based on the record of the United States House of Representatives and United 
States Senate votes on the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, which lists 
25 
 
the Congress members who voted in favor and against the passage of the bill.  I create variables for the 
number of Democrats in the 89th Congress whose jurisdiction includes each city and the number of total 
votes in favor of the bill from Congress members whose jurisdiction includes each city. 
For their paper, “The Economic Aftermath of the 1960s Riots in American Cities:  Evidence from 
Property Values” William Collins and Robert Margo created an index for the severity of 1960s riots in 
each city.  The data were matched successfully to the Census data by name, with the exception of 
Phoenix, AZ, which was not listed under the Census places.  The Collins and Margo paper was limited to 
major U.S. cities, so most of the places in the census data had a missing value for their riots index.   I 
replaced those missing values with zeros, under the assumption that smaller cities did not experience 
riots. 
Finally, I procured crime data for 1968 for places and counties from the National Archive of 
Criminal Justice Data.  The data in the archive have been collected by the FBI every year since 1930 from 
local police departments in accordance with uniform crime reporting standards developed in 1929.  The 
1968 dataset included variables for total actual criminal offenses for each month and population of the 
area surveyed by the reporting police department.  I used these data to create an average monthly crime 
rate variable. 
 
5.2 Empirical Specification and Strategy 
In order to make comparisons at the city level, I must construct a suitable comparison group of 
cities that did not receive Model Cities funding. Ideally, I would observe model cities as they would have 
been had they not received federal funding through the program, but clearly this is impossible.  Also, the 
Model Cities Program was not administered through a case-control study, and cities were not selected into 
the program or into a control group at random.  However, many U.S. cities did go untreated, and by 
assigning those cities that were the most similar to model cities at baseline to a comparison group, I can 
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estimate the effect of the program on the treated group.  I use a propensity score matching system and a 
probit model to construct this comparison group.   
 As Caliendo and Kopoening (2008) write, propensity score matching must satisfy the conditional 
independence assumption and the common support condition.  The conditional independence assumption 
implies that all variables that affect both the decision to treat and the outcome of the treatment should be 
included in the model, and the common support assumption says that observations with the same values 
for all of the variables in the model have the same probability of being accepted into the program. 
In order to satisfy the conditional independence assumption, I choose variables to include in my 
model based on historical accounts of HUD’s selection process and the political atmosphere of the day.  
First, the motivation for including a riots index comes from David Gale’s account of the political climate 
surrounding the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act’s passage through Congress.  
According to Gale, the act was billed as the solution to racial violence and urban riots.  It is reasonable to 
assume, then, that the cities’ riot histories played a role in HUD’s selection process, and that a riots index 
should be included in the model.  The proportion of residents that were black is included in the model for 
the same reason.  Gale also writes that crime rates, the representative Congress members’ voting history 
surrounding the bill, population density, and unemployment played a role in HUD’s decisions.  Hence, 
these variables are also included in the model. 
Gilbert and Specht (1969) report that only 9 of the 63 cities chosen by HUD in the first round to 
receive Model Cities grants were represented in the House of Representatives by Republicans.  I include 
the number of Democrats in Congress in the model to account for this partisan bias.  Contrary to their 
account, though, the estimated coefficient on this variable turns out to be negative. 
Finally, I include total federal funds, by county, as a proxy for city organization and achievement.  
Rich (1979) offers support for the inclusion of this variable in my model.  He writes, “For many federal 
programs, state and local governments are the key decision makers in regard to the distribution of federal 
aid, for they are the ones who decide whether or not to apply for aid, how much to ask for, and how often 
they will seek assistance.”  County-level data were available, whereas city-level data were not, so one 
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potential flaw is that a disorganized city that did not receive much federal aid but that is located in a 
county with a high-achieving city will have an artificially high propensity score. 
With these facts in mind, I generate propensity scores for every U.S. city for which the data are 
available using the following probit model: 
 (4) Pr(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 1| 𝒙𝒙) = Φ (𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖7𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖7𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟7𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠7𝑐𝑐   +
 𝛽𝛽5𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢7𝑐𝑐  + 𝛽𝛽6𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢68𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽10𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐)  
Where Pr denotes probability, Φ  is the Cumulative Distribution Function of the standard normal 
distribution, unemprt7 is the city’s unemployment rate in 1970; povrat7 is the proportion of the city’s 
population below the poverty line in 1970; shrblk7 is the proportion of the city’s population that is black 
or African American in the same year; popdens7 is the city-wide population density in the same year; 
citypop7 is the total population of the city in the same year; votes is the total number of votes in support 
of the program by Congress members whose constituency includes city c;12 13 dems is the number of 
members of Congress in the Democratic Party in 1966 whose constituency includes city c; federalgrants 
is the dollar amount of federal funding through Great Society programs to the county in which the city is 
located between 1965 and 1967; crimerate68 is the average monthly crime rate in the city in 1968; and 
riots is an index for intensity of 1960s race riots based on number of injuries, arrests, and other relevant 
factors.14
Figure 3 shows the distribution of propensity scores for model cities and all possible comparison 
group cities.  Note that this sample includes only 118 model cities and 3,727 possible comparison group 
cities because those are the cities for which data for all of the variables in the probit model above are 
  Standard errors are generated using the observed information matrix. 
                                                            
12 If cities crossed congressional district boundaries but had identical political information in both districts, I included only one 
observation.  If they crossed congressional boundaries and the outcomes would be different if they were in one or the other, I 
included two observations.  If any of the observations matched into the data by the method described in section ten, they were 
included in the final sample. 
13 The map of the 89th congressional district boundaries lacked some detail.  Some major metropolitan regions showed that 
several Congress members represented the same area, resulting in artificially high numbers of representative Democrats and 
votes.  These cities were some of the largest in the country, though, so they were unlikely to have appropriate comparison cities. 
14 Many of these variables are for 1970, which is after cities were selected into the program.  However, 1970 is the nearest census 
year to 1967, when HUD began reviewing applications.  Much of this paper is written under the reasonable assumption that in 
1970 effects of Model Cities were not yet felt. 
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available.  Also, notice that the range of propensity scores that have density in both the model cities and 
the non-model cities is between 0 and .85.   
I find the nearest neighbor among non-model cities to each of the 118 model city in the sample by 
calculating the absolute difference between the propensity scores of every non-model city and each model 
city.  I exclude model cities and their nearest neighbors from the sample when the difference between 
their propensity scores is more than 1 percentage point because these pairings are not close enough to 
being equally likely to being selected into the program. 
Finally, to ensure common support, I trim my sample down to only those cities with propensity 
scores less than .85.   This limits my sample to a range of propensity scores that includes both model 
cities and comparison group cities.  Figure 4 shows the distribution of propensity scores in the trimmed 
sample.  In all, the resultant sample has 81 model cities and 65 comparison group cities.  There are fewer 
comparison group cities because in several cases the nearest neighbor to one model city was also the 
nearest neighbor to another.  The mean propensity score for model cities is .15 and the mean for the 
comparison group is .12. 
Table 6 shows baseline differences between the model cities group and the comparison group on 
several key variables.  The comparison group cities have slightly fewer households, on average, and 
slightly higher average income than the model cities in the sample.  These differences are not large in 
magnitude and are not significantly different from 0 at the 5% confidence level.  Overall, the cities 
selected by the probit model into the comparison group are very similar to the model cities in the trimmed 
sample. 
Finally, I use the twelve outcome variables seen throughout this paper as dependent variables in 
the following city-level linear regression models: 
 (5)  𝑌𝑌𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐 ∙ 𝐷𝐷80𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐 ∙ 𝐷𝐷90𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐 ∙ 𝐷𝐷00𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐷𝐷80𝑖𝑖  + 𝛽𝛽5𝐷𝐷90𝑖𝑖  +
 𝛽𝛽6𝐷𝐷00𝑖𝑖  + 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐 + 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖  
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(6)  𝑌𝑌𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐 ∙ 𝐷𝐷80𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐 ∙ 𝐷𝐷90𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐 ∙ 𝐷𝐷00𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐷𝐷80𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐷𝐷90𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽6𝐷𝐷00𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐 + 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐 + 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖  
where MC is coded 1 for model cities in the trimmed sample and 0 for matched controls; MCF is federal 
Model Cities funding in 1971, divided by total 1970 city population, in thousands of dollars, and coded 0 
for control group cities; and the vector fc includes city fixed effects.  As in previous tables, the 
coefficients on the interaction terms are of interest.  Estimates from the first equation illustrate the 
difference in changes between model cities and comparison group cities between 1970 and other census 
years.  Estimates from the second equation show the effect of additional Model Cities funding on city-
wide outcomes over the same time period.  One would expect to see stronger effects in cities that received 
higher-intensity funding. 
 
5.3 City-level results 
Results from model 5 are summarized in table 7.  Column 1 shows that model cities did not see 
significant differences in population change from comparison group cities, and that on average, the cities 
in the entire sample did not show significant population growth in the first twenty years following the 
program.  However, column 2 shows that model cities saw an increase in the number of households 8.7 
percentage points smaller between 1970 and 1980 than comparison group cities, which on average, saw a 
15 percent gain over the same time period.  This suggests that residents in comparison group cities 
reduced their number of children over time more than in model cities.  Column 3 shows that the increase 
in the retention rate between 1970 and 1980 for model cities was 1.7 percentage points smaller than in 
comparison cities.   This coefficient is statistically significant, but not large in magnitude.  Model cities 
also saw larger decreases in the white share of their population than the comparison group between 1970 
and 1990 (column 4) and in the proportion of workers working in their county of residency (column 6).  
Perhaps most tellingly, model cities saw larger increases in their poverty rates than comparison group 
cities over the thirty years following the implementation of the program.  Taken together, the results in 
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table 7 suggest that model cities did not see significant improvements along any of the twelve key 
outcome variables as a result of the program.  They also suggest that program did not reduce migration 
away from target cities. 
Table 8 presents the results of estimates from model 6.  The table shows how variation in 
intensity of the model cities program, as measured through funds per capita, impacted the twelve key 
outcome variables.  Column 1 shows that cities with smaller populations in 1970 generally received more 
funding per capita than cities with large populations. In fact, each additional thousand dollars per capita 
corresponds to a 15 percent smaller baseline population.  On the other hand, there is no correspondence 
between the amount of funding devoted to a city and the change in population or number of households in 
the first twenty years following the program.  In other words, no matter the intensity of the program, 
population stayed about constant over the first twenty years in all of the cities in the sample.  
Interestingly, though, column 3 shows that additional Model Cities funds are correlated with larger 
reductions in retention rate over the time period under study.  The results from these three columns 
suggest more migration both into and out of cities that received more Model Cities funds per capita. 
The rest of table 8 suggests that overall, cities that had higher intensity programs did not see 
significantly different changes from the rest of the cities in the sample on the other nine outcome 
variables in the first ten years of the program, and that, with the exception of the proportion of workers 
working in their county of residence, the same holds true when comparing the baseline to 1990.  Whereas 
table 7 shows a negative relationship between selection into the Model Cities Program and most of the 
outcome variables under study, table 8 does not show statistically significant relationships between Model 
Cities funding and the outcome variables in any direction.   
Neither table 7 nor table 8 suggests that the Model Cities Program had beneficial effects on city-
wide outcomes.  This is further support for the contention that the program did not have the desired 




5.3.1 Comparing within-city differences across cities 
In section 4, I showed that model neighborhoods saw less improvement or greater loss along 
many of the key variables than comparison areas in the same cities between 1970 and 2000.  It is 
conceivable that this was the general trend when comparing the most blighted areas of all U.S. cities to 
less-blighted neighborhoods over the same period, and that the Model Cities Program mitigated these 
differences somewhat.  To test this hypothesis, I predict the most likely model neighborhood in each tract 
in each city in my matched dataset using the same method as described in section 4.3.2.  In other words, 
whether or not a city was actually selected into the Model Cities Program, I predict which tract would 
most likely be selected by the city government as the model neighborhood if the city were to receive 
funding.  As in section 4.3.2, I create a dummy variable, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀� , equal to 1 for tracts whose central points 
are within .04 latitudinal and longitudinal degrees of the predicted central point of the model 
neighborhood, and equal to 0 for tracts whose central points are between .85 and .1 degrees from the 
predicted central model neighborhood point. 
Next, I estimate the following linear regression model for each of my twelve chosen outcome 
variables: 
(7) 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀� 𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝐷80𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀� 𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝐷90𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀� 𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝐷00𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀� 𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝐷80𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽5𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀� 𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝐷90𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀� 𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝐷00𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝐷80𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝐷90𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝐷00𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐷𝐷80𝑖𝑖  +
𝛽𝛽11𝐷𝐷90𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽12𝐷𝐷00𝑖𝑖  + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
where 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�  is the model neighborhood dummy variable described above; MC is the indicator variable set 
equal to 1 for tracts in model cities in the trimmed sample and set equal to 0 for tracts in matched 
comparison group cites; the time indicator variables are the same as used throughout this paper; the 
interaction terms are created by multiplying the expected dummy variables together; and f contains tract 
fixed effects.  The coefficients of interest are on the interaction terms between 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀� , MC, and the time 
indicator variables.  These coefficients will show how selection into the Model Cities Program affected 
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differences in changes between 1970 and 2000 between poor, blighted areas and surrounding comparison 
areas. 
Ordinary least squares estimates for these regressions are listed in table 9.  Columns 1, 2, and 3 
show that predicted model neighborhoods in model cities saw smaller decreases in population, number of 
households, and retention rate, relative to surrounding tracts, than predicted model neighborhoods in the 
comparison group.  The table suggests that model neighborhoods retained more of their population from 
outmigration than the most blighted areas in comparison cities. 
However, the other nine variables listed in the table show no significant differences of this kind 




The results described in this paper indicate that the Model Cities Program did not live up to its 
founders’ stated goals.  In nearly every table presented in this paper, status as a model city or as a tract in 
a model neighborhood was correlated with worse outcomes along the variables intended to measure 
success in achieving program founders’ aims.  At the within-city level, model neighborhoods generally 
fared worse than surrounding neighborhoods when comparisons were made in changes in poverty rate, 
dependence on welfare average income, and other outcome variables related to the program designers’ 
aims.  Furthermore, analysis along a matched dataset confirmed at the across-city level what the initial 
estimates suggested on the within-city level.  Between 1970 and 2000, model cities did not see greater 
improvement, relative to matched cities, along any of the twelve variables analyzed.  In fact, when 
comparing changes in poverty rates, model cities fared worse. 
These results suggest that Model Cities was generally ineffective in reducing urban blight in the 
long term.  Of course, the program could have had positive effects that are not reflected in my tables, 
either because the variables selected for analysis did not adequately reflect areas of improvement, because 
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effects of the program petered out by 1980, or because of confounding factors that were not taken into 
account in my strategies for capturing these effects. 
Findings on population changes and retention rates vary.  Tracts in model neighborhoods in my 
small sample did not see smaller losses in population or different changes in retention rates between 1970 
and 1980 than tracts in bordering areas (table 2).  However, when compared with tracts farther away, 
model neighborhoods saw both higher retention rates and larger decreases in their population (table 4a).  
In other words, comparison group tracts experienced a larger turnover in population, but model 
neighborhoods saw a greater general decline.  This pattern of larger losses in population and larger 
increases in retention rates carries over to a larger sample of cities selected into the program (table 5a).  
At the city-level, model cities did not see population changes significantly different than comparison 
group cities, but their retention rates increased less over the same period (table 7).  Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, model neighborhoods retained more of their population, relative to surrounding tracts, 
than equally blighted areas in the group of matched comparison cities (table 9). 
The decrease in outmigration from model neighborhoods could point to some positive outcomes 
of the program.  For one thing, successes along variables that were not measured in this paper could have 
helped these areas to retain their population.  Second, along with the relatively increase in population, one 
would expect larger increases in rents and housing values in model neighborhoods, relative to 
surrounding areas, when compared to the most blighted areas of comparison group cities.  However, the 
evidence from table 9 did not show this effect.  This could point to success in providing low and moderate 
income housing to the population.     
My results showing overall ineffectiveness of the Model Cities Program agree with several 
historical accounts (Hetzel, 1993; Weissman, 1978; Judson, 1972.)  Warren (1973) takes a positive view 
of the program, despite its ineffectiveness.  He writes, “Model Cities is to be justified not for bettered 
slum conditions, its original purpose, but rather for strengthening the cities’ ability to comprehensive 
planning and coordination.”  Some of the theories for why Model Cities did not produce its intended 
results are that federal guidelines were confusing to local agents (Marshall Kaplan, et al, 1970), that 
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federal officers were unable to evaluate cities accurately when selecting which cities to fund (Gilbert and 
Speech, 1974), that federal agents underestimated the time and funding required to involve citizens in the 
planning process (Judson, 1972) or that the program was simply underfunded relative to its broad goals 
(Judson, 1972).  Each of these theories warrants further investigation.  My results cannot be used to 
distinguish between these potential causes.   
In certain ways, the results from my study are consistent with the view that place-based policies 
introduce inefficiencies into the urban system, causing overall loss.  A potential chain of causation that 
could explain the figures in tables 7 and 9 is that Model Cities funds created some unseen result in model 
neighborhoods that reduced outmigration from areas.  The residents of neighborhoods chose to stay in 
those areas rather than work in other places where they might be more productive, and, as a result, the 
model cities in the sample saw smaller gains over the tested period on key outcome variables than the 
comparison group.  It is more likely, however, that model neighborhood residents took more jobs farther 
out in cities, as evidence by the public transit results in section 4, and that efficiency losses of this type 
were small. 
An alternative interpretation is that, among its many aims, the Model Cities Program was most 
effective in improving education in model neighborhoods.  The results presented in tables 4a and 5a 
support this notion.  As demonstrated by the model in Glaser and Redlick (2008), when human capital 
gains outweigh social capital accrued to people in declining areas, they emigrate.  This would explain the 
losses in population in model neighborhoods relative to other areas.  If this is the case, my results 
ironically imply that the Model Cities Program spurred migration out of the most blighted neighborhoods 
of America’s cities by investing in human capital, a mobile resource. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 In this paper I present an empirical evaluation of the Model Cities Program in terms of its many 
stated aims by estimating differences-in-differences between a variety of comparison groups and groups 
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treated by the Model Cities Program on several indicators of economic prosperity and urban 
rehabilitation.  I compare tracts in model neighborhoods to those in surrounding areas in ten cities for 
which maps are available and find that status as a model neighborhood tract is not associated with 
beneficial changes between 1970 and later census years along any of the outcome variables.  Comparisons 
between model neighborhoods and areas farther away yield similar results. 
 I also run a comparison between model cities and cities that were not selected into the program in 
order to evaluate city-wide outcomes.  I find that the Model Cities Program is associated with larger 
increases in the poverty rate and welfare rate in model cities, and that additional funds are associated with 
larger decreases in retention rates.  
My preliminary analysis provides no evidence for strong positive effects of the Model Cities 
Program on most indicators of urban development.  However, I do show that tracts in model 
neighborhoods were better able to retain their population relative to outside areas when compared to the 
most blighted areas of comparison cities.  The results from my study can be interpreted to support the 
notion that place-based policies cause efficiency losses, but this interpretation is based on the assumption 
that the program had some positive, unrecorded effect.  In terms of the overall effectiveness of place-
based policies, my study is inconclusive. 
This study of the Model Cities Program shows that it is difficult to measure success against 
broad, lofty goals.  The Model Cities Program set out very vague and obtuse aims, agreed to fund 
particular localities, and allowed municipal governments and citizen boards to create their own plans for 
the use of these funds.  In reviewing the program’s effectiveness in achieving its goals, I was left to study 
broad indicators of economic success.  More precisely outlined requirements and specific aims might 
have helped the program achieve success in certain program areas.  In order to see results, future policies 





8. Data Appendix 
Much of the research presented in this paper focused on a sample of ten cities for which model 
neighborhood maps or boundary descriptions were readily available.  My method for locating these maps 
and boundary descriptions involved the following algorithm.  First, basic searches for “model cities,” 
“model neighborhood” and each of these search terms with “map” in the University of Michigan library 
catalog brought out relevant information regarding Detroit's model neighborhood.  Next, the search terms 
“ “model cities” program map city site:.gov” “ “model neighborhood” map city site:.gov” and “ “model 
cities” program boundaries city site:.gov” and “ “model neighborhood” boundaries city site:.gov”, each of 
these search terms with the word “archives”, and each of these search terms without the site:.gov 
limitation were entered into the Google search engine for each of the 150 model cities.  The first three 
pages of results were examined (if indeed there were three pages) and the first two pages of images.  As 
soon as a suitable map or boundary for each city arose, the search terms were entered for the next city on 
the list.    
For the city-level comparisons, to calculate city-level means from tract-level data, I multiplied the 
tract-level data by tract population, summed the results by place, and then divided by the total population 
of all the tracts in each place combined.  In this way I assured that even if the 1998 place boundaries 
include areas that were undeveloped in 1970, the city-level variables remain true to reality.  Still, there are 
ways that 1998 city boundaries can introduce measurement error into my estimates.  First, if the city was 
larger in area in 1970 than in 1998, then included tracts will not capture a full picture of the city at the 
time.  Second, estimates of population density will be low in all expanding cities; and, even worse, those 
estimates will be more in accurate in cities that expanded at a more rapid rate over the 1970-1998 period.  
Nevertheless, I believe that aggregating tract-level census data was the best way to obtain city-level data 
for the purpose of this project. 
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The 1971 Model Cities funding data are from a report issued by the U.S. General Accounting 
Office on January 14, 1972 entitled “Improvements Needed in Federal Agency Coordination and 
Participation in the Model Cities Program.”  There are at least two reasons that these data do not perfectly 
reflect actual allocations to model cities.  First, according to a footnote on the document, “These amounts 
are target allocations and do not, in all cases, represent the amounts of funds actually allocated.”  Those 
cities that were not organized enough to spend all of the allocated funds did not receive their entire 
granted sum.   Moreover, the data do not include values for the successive years of the program.  
Nevertheless, I argue that this document offers the best available information on grants allocated to these 
cities, and that these numbers serve as a valuable proxy for actual investment. 
As a final note, matching crime data to the place-level census data was complicated, as the FBI 
has its own coding system for cities and towns.  I relied on name variables to merge the datasets together, 
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Difference            
(3) - (2)
Population density (/10,000) 0.140 0.163 0.116 -0.047***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.014)
Number of households (/10,000) 0.124 0.121 0.127 0.006
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
Proportion white 0.550 0.395 0.704 0.309***
(0.027) (0.036) (0.034) (0.050)
High school educated 0.387 0.353 0.421 0.068***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.019)
Poverty rate 0.249 0.289 0.209 -0.080***
(0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.015)
Average income (/10,000) 0.706 0.635 0.777 0.142***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.019) (0.024)
Average house value (/100,000) 0.144 0.130 0.159 0.284**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008)
Average rent (/100) 0.276 0.378 0.174 -0.203***
(0.019) (0.027) (0.023) (0.036)
Observations 192 96 96
Table 1:  Baseline Summary Statistics
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
"Population density" is total population divided by land area, in square miles. "High school 
educated" is the proportion of residents twenty-five years and older who have obtained at least a high 
school education.  "Poverty rate" is the proportion of residents below the poverty line.  "Welfare 
rate" is the proportion of households that received public assistance income in the year prior to the 
census.  "Average income" is average total household income in the year prior to the census.  
"Average house value" is the average value of a random sample of owner-occupied non-condo 
Source:  1970 U.S. Census
Sample:  Census tracts that are either in model neighborhoods, bordering those neighborhoods, or 
Standard errors reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Ln 
population
























D80 x MN -0.083 -0.068 0.012 0.041 -0.028 0.002 -0.016 -0.005 0.010 -0.021 -0.018 -0.938
(1.27) (1.00) (0.69) (1.72) (2.13)* (0.10) (1.08) (0.27) (0.67) (0.48) (0.23) (8.63)**
D90 x MN -0.138 -0.130 0.031 0.095 -0.055 0.017 -0.001 0.015 0.015 -0.048 0.116 -0.890
(2.10)* (1.90) (1.81) (3.99)** (4.20)** (0.93) (0.10) (0.90) (1.00) (1.10) (1.50) (8.17)**
D00 x MN -0.170 -0.168 0.033 0.123 -0.072 0.005 0.006 -0.038 -0.016 0.013 0.139 -0.912
(2.59)** (2.47)* (1.93) (5.18)** (5.47)** (0.27) (0.38) (2.26)* (1.13) (0.30) (1.79) (8.39)**
D80 -0.177 -0.090 0.079 -0.154 -0.024 -0.008 0.149 0.037 0.051 0.620 0.816 2.595
(3.74)** (1.82) (6.47)** (8.99)** (2.52)* (0.61) (13.63)** (3.11)** (4.84)** (19.60)** (14.89)** (31.13)**
D90 -0.227 -0.147 0.063 -0.264 -0.039 -0.059 0.183 0.084 0.066 1.143 1.409 3.235
(4.79)** (2.98)** (5.11)** (15.45)** (4.13)** (4.43)** (16.77)** (7.01)** (6.27)** (35.87)** (25.78)** (38.69)**
D00 -0.279 -0.173 0.031 -0.300 -0.058 -0.084 0.244 0.061 0.053 1.571 1.828 3.535
(5.90)** (3.50)** (2.56)* (17.55)** (6.13)** (6.26)** (22.39)** (5.05)** (5.06)** (49.48)** (33.42)** (42.41)**
Constant 8.003 6.968 0.746 0.542 0.291 0.863 0.388 0.263 0.152 8.813 9.530 3.163
(345.92)** (290.17)** (124.44)** (64.79)** (62.43)** (131.86)** (72.93)** (44.61)** (29.50)** (570.11)** (344.86)** (77.85)**
Observations 879 876 884 884 884 884 879 884 884 876 793 826
Tracts 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 212 220
R-squared 0.19 0.10 0.17 0.44 0.29 0.14 0.64 0.17 0.15 0.90 0.83 0.86
Sample:  Census tracts that are either in model neighborhoods, bordering those neighborhoods, or bordering tracts that border model neighborhoods for ten cities for which 
Table 2: Effect of Model Cities Program on Selected Model Neighborhoods, as Compared to Surrounding Areas
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.  Tract fixed effects included in regressions.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
"Retention rate" is the proportion of residents five years and older who have lived in the same county for at least five years.  "Public transit rate" is the proportion of working 
persons to travel to work on public transportation.  "Proportion working in county" is the proportion of workers who work within their county of residence.  "High school 
educated" is the proportion of residents twenty-five years and older who have obtained at least a high school education.  "Poverty rate" is the proportion of residents below the 
poverty line.  "Welfare rate" is the proportion of households that received public assistance income in the year prior to the census.  "Average income" is average total 
household income in the year prior to the census.  "Average house value" is the average value of a random sample of owner-occupied non-condo housing units.  "Average rent" 
is the average rent for a random sample of housing units where the occupant is paying cash rent.
MN=1 if at least half of the census tract area is located within the model neighborhood.  MN=0 if less than half of the census tract is within the model neighborhood and the 
census tract either touches neighborhood boundaries or borders a tract that touches neighborhood boundaries.  The time indicator variables, D80, D90, and D00, equal 1 if the 
data is for the year 1980, 1990, and 2000, respectively, and 0 otherwise.  The interaction terms "D80 x MN", "D90 x MN" and "D00 x MN" were calculated by multiplying 
Source:  U.S. Census, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Ln population -0.083 -0.069 0.091 -0.138 -0.126 0.080 -0.170 -0.164 0.041
(1.27) (1.02) (0.86) (2.10)* (1.85) (0.76) (2.59)** (2.41)* (0.39)
Ln number of households -0.068 -0.049 0.107 -0.130 -0.118 0.087 -0.168 -0.161 0.040
(1.00) (0.69) (0.95) (1.90) (1.64) (0.77) (2.47)* (2.26)* (0.36)
Retention rate 0.012 0.026 0.023 0.031 0.041 0.026 0.033 0.042 0.064
(0.69) (1.50) (0.93) (1.81) (2.39)* (1.02) (1.93) (2.45)* (2.53)*
Proportion white 0.041 0.049 0.022 0.095 0.101 0.061 0.123 0.124 0.103
(1.72) (2.05)* (0.64) (3.99)** (4.29)** (1.78) (5.18)** (5.24)** (3.00)**
Public transit rate -0.028 -0.027 -0.009 -0.055 -0.060 -0.045 -0.072 -0.073 -0.041
(2.13)* (1.93) (0.45) (4.20)** (4.29)** (2.23)* (5.47)** (5.25)** (2.02)*
Proportion working in county 0.002 0.011 -0.006 0.017 0.028 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.010
(0.10) (0.60) (0.24) (0.93) (1.55) (0.25) (0.27) (0.38) (0.44)
High school educated -0.016 -0.024 -0.033 -0.001 -0.011 -0.029 0.006 -0.002 -0.015
(1.08) (1.53) (1.42) (0.10) (0.72) (1.26) (0.38) (0.10) (0.65)
Poverty rate -0.005 0.003 -0.000 0.015 0.014 0.011 -0.038 -0.041 -0.023
(0.27) (0.19) (0.00) (0.90) (0.86) (0.48) (2.26)* (2.42)* (0.97)
Welfare rate 0.010 0.022 0.007 0.015 0.009 -0.002 -0.016 -0.006 -0.031
(0.67) (1.64) (0.38) (1.00) (0.65) (0.12) (1.13) (0.43) (1.66)
Ln average income -0.021 -0.027 -0.047 -0.048 -0.018 -0.080 0.013 0.015 -0.047
(0.48) (0.68) (0.87) (1.10) (0.45) (1.49) (0.30) (0.38) (0.89)
Ln average house value -0.018 -0.032 0.019 0.116 0.071 -0.026 0.139 0.082 -0.054
(0.23) (0.41) (0.17) (1.50) (0.90) (0.23) (1.79) (1.05) (0.48)
Ln average rent -0.938 -0.985 -0.801 -0.890 -0.954 -0.797 -0.912 -0.979 -0.787
(8.63)** (8.89)** (4.71)** (8.17)** (8.60)** (4.67)** (8.39)** (8.84)** (4.63)**
Observations 888 808 384 888 808 384 888 808 384
Tracts 222 202 96 222 202 96 222 202 96
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
Reported here are estimated coefficients for interaction terms between the MN treatment variable and time indicators (D70, D80, and D90.)  Time indicator variables and 
tract fixed effects were also included in these regressions.
Columns 1, 4, 7:  MN=1 if at least half of the census tract area is located within the model neighborhood.  MN=0 if less than half of the census tract is within the model 
neighborhood and the census tract either touches neighborhood boundaries or borders a tract that touches neighborhood boundaries.  
Sample, source, and dependent variables are the same as those reported in Table 2.
Columns 3, 6, and 9: MN=1 if the tract lies entirely within the model neighborhood and touches the border.  MN=0 if the tract lies entirely outside the model 
neighborhood and touches the border. 
Columns 2, 5, and 8: MN=1 if at least half the tract is within the model neighborhood.  MN=0 if at least half of the census tract is located outside the model neighborhood 
and either touches the boundaries or borders a tract that touches the boundaries.
Table 3:  Effect of Model Cities Program on Selected Model Neighborhoods, as Compared to Surrounding Areas
Comparison of three codings of model neighborhood indicator variable
D80 x MN D90 x MN D00 x MN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Ln 
population



















D80 x MN -0.281 -0.335 0.033 -0.008 -0.034 -0.017 0.009 -0.004 0.000 0.005 0.045 -0.647
(5.03)** (5.84)** (2.65)** (0.37) (3.79)** (1.13) (0.77) (0.36) (0.01) (0.16) (0.73) (7.08)**
D90 x MN -0.371 -0.463 0.047 0.027 -0.063 -0.012 0.033 0.015 0.004 -0.018 0.241 -0.558
(6.65)** (8.06)** (3.83)** (1.23) (7.00)** (0.83) (2.90)** (1.32) (0.37) (0.54) (3.92)** (6.11)**
D00 x MN -0.449 -0.534 0.025 0.105 -0.096 -0.023 0.057 -0.053 -0.040 0.094 0.228 -0.542
(8.05)** (9.28)** (1.99)* (4.71)** (10.62)** (1.53) (5.08)** (4.51)** (3.49)** (2.83)** (3.72)** (5.92)**
D80 0.021 0.178 0.058 -0.105 -0.018 0.010 0.124 0.037 0.061 0.593 0.753 2.304
(0.62) (5.20)** (7.92)** (7.91)** (3.32)** (1.19) (18.48)** (5.35)** (9.02)** (29.94)** (21.61)** (31.33)**
D90 0.006 0.186 0.046 -0.197 -0.031 -0.030 0.149 0.084 0.077 1.112 1.284 2.904
(0.17) (5.44)** (6.27)** (14.88)** (5.87)** (3.41)** (22.33)** (12.08)** (11.37)** (56.50)** (37.24)** (39.48)**
D00 0.000 0.193 0.040 -0.282 -0.035 -0.056 0.193 0.076 0.077 1.491 1.739 3.165
(0.01) (5.66)** (5.39)** (21.33)** (6.47)** (6.41)** (28.81)** (10.92)** (11.37)** (75.75)** (50.42)** (43.03)**
Constant 8.077 6.979 0.770 0.703 0.209 0.755 0.471 0.162 0.096 9.069 9.696 3.362
(428.13)** (358.84)** (184.50)** (93.40)** (68.67)** (151.62)** (124.04)** (40.90)** (24.95)** (810.48)** (475.47)** (77.57)**
Observations 1300 1300 1308 1308 1308 1308 1300 1308 1308 1295 1232 1119
Tracts 326 327 327 327 327 327 326 327 327 327 321 325
R-squared 0.11 0.10 0.16 0.39 0.30 0.12 0.64 0.24 0.21 0.92 0.83 0.86
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4a: Comparing Model Neighborhood to Untreated Areas .85-.1 Degrees Away
"Retention rate" is the proportion of residents five years and older who have lived in the same county for at least five years.  "Public transit rate" is the proportion of working persons 
to travel to work on public transportation.  "Proportion working in county" is the proportion of workers who work within their county of residence.  "High school educated" is the 
proportion of residents twenty-five years and older who have obtained at least a high school education.  "Poverty rate" is the proportion of residents below the poverty line.  "Welfare 
rate" is the proportion of households that received public assistance income in the year prior to the census.  "Average income" is average total household income in the year prior to 
the census.  "Average house value" is the average value of a random sample of owner-occupied non-condo housing units.  "Average rent" is the average rent for a random sample of 
housing units where the occupant is paying cash rent.
MN=1 if at least half the area of the census tract is included in the model neighborhood.  MN=0 if the central point of the tract is between .085 and .1 degrees from the estimated 
central point of the model neighborhood.  The time indicator variables, D80, D90, and D00, equal 1 if the data is for the year 1980, 1990, and 2000, respectively, and 0 otherwise.  
The interaction terms "D80 x MN", "D90 x MN" and "D00 x MN" were calculated by multiplying MN by the time indicator variables.
Source:  U.S. Census, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000
Sample:  Census tracts within .1 degrees of central model neighborhood points in ten model cities for which model neighborhood maps were available.  They are Asheville, NC; 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Ln 
population






















D80 x MNa -0.091 -0.137 0.013 -0.044 -0.009 -0.013 0.020 -0.002 -0.005 0.022 -0.004 -0.210
(3.45)** (4.94)** (1.73) (4.07)** (1.77) (1.69) (3.42)** (0.36) (0.94) (1.27) (0.13) (3.82)**
D80 x MNb -0.185 -0.237 0.006 -0.014 -0.014 -0.023 0.022 -0.007 -0.022 0.025 0.103 -0.187
(4.34)** (5.28)** (0.48) (0.77) (1.66) (1.93) (2.30)* (0.74) (2.67)** (0.90) (2.13)* (1.62)
D80 x MNc -0.272 -0.326 0.007 -0.034 -0.014 -0.057 0.026 0.001 -0.010 -0.009 0.033 -0.026
(5.03)** (5.74)** (0.43) (1.50) (1.29) (3.69)** (2.18)* (0.12) (0.97) (0.24) (0.53) (0.17)
D90 x MNa -0.114 -0.191 0.009 -0.047 -0.027 -0.007 0.036 0.002 -0.006 0.015 0.077 -0.159
(4.33)** (6.90)** (1.23) (4.28)** (5.20)** (0.93) (6.14)** (0.29) (1.23) (0.88) (2.51)* (2.89)**
D90 x MNb -0.242 -0.296 0.015 0.010 -0.039 -0.018 0.045 -0.009 -0.028 0.050 0.183 -0.119
(5.67)** (6.58)** (1.28) (0.60) (4.68)** (1.52) (4.80)** (0.88) (3.36)** (1.78) (3.82)** (1.03)
D90 x MNc -0.348 -0.442 -0.005 -0.030 -0.038 -0.049 0.046 0.004 -0.014 0.020 0.215 0.053
(6.44)** (7.79)** (0.33) (1.33) (3.51)** (3.18)** (3.88)** (0.34) (1.33) (0.55) (3.53)** (0.34)
D00 x MNa -0.153 -0.198 0.005 -0.004 -0.037 -0.010 0.046 -0.019 -0.020 0.041 0.056 -0.159
(5.81)** (7.13)** (0.72) (0.34) (7.14)** (1.40) (7.90)** (3.00)** (3.96)** (2.37)* (1.84) (2.89)**
D00 x MNb -0.275 -0.322 -0.010 0.052 -0.053 -0.016 0.061 -0.038 -0.044 0.116 0.152 -0.106
(6.44)** (7.16)** (0.86) (2.97)** (6.28)** (1.33) (6.42)** (3.75)** (5.23)** (4.15)** (3.19)** (0.92)
D00 x MNc -0.426 -0.507 -0.018 0.020 -0.050 -0.068 0.067 -0.023 -0.033 0.088 0.177 0.084
(7.88)** (8.94)** (1.16) (0.90) (4.69)** (4.40)** (5.59)** (1.80) (3.08)** (2.50)* (2.92)** (0.54)
D80 0.352 0.608 0.039 -0.034 0.005 0.068 0.079 0.041 0.080 0.568 0.699 2.596
(4.61)** (7.58)** (1.83) (1.07) (0.35) (3.13)** (4.69)** (2.27)* (5.35)** (11.30)** (8.03)** (12.73)**
D90 0.430 0.766 0.035 -0.135 0.034 0.015 0.068 0.083 0.102 1.066 1.004 3.070
(5.63)** (9.55)** (1.62) (4.27)** (2.24)* (0.70) (4.00)** (4.56)** (6.81)** (21.32)** (11.63)** (15.05)**
D00 0.525 0.831 0.049 -0.310 0.054 0.004 0.082 0.123 0.134 1.351 1.515 3.306
(6.88)** (10.36)** (2.30)* (9.81)** (3.56)** (0.17) (4.85)** (6.80)** (8.92)** (27.02)** (17.55)** (16.21)**
Constant 8.119 7.025 0.756 0.747 0.207 0.772 0.479 0.158 0.089 9.085 9.730 3.141
(954.78)** (786.13)** (317.97)** (212.65)** (123.33)** (319.29)** (254.56)** (78.26)** (53.51)** (1630.53)** (987.03)** (134.95)**
Observations 5340 5334 5400 5400 5400 5400 5340 5400 5400 5315 5040 4557
Tracts 1345 1346 1350 1350 1350 1350 1345 1350 1350 1345 1317 1338
R-squared 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.41 0.18 0.15 0.66 0.18 0.17 0.92 0.84 0.84
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
Table 4b: Comparing Model Neighborhood Area to Untreated Areas .4-.1 Degrees Away, In Groups
MNa=0 if the central point of the tract is between .04 and .085 degrees and 1 otherwise.  MNb=0 if the tract's central point is between .085 and .095 degrees from the central 
model neighborhood point and 1 otherwise.  MNc=0 if the tract's central point is between .095 and .1 degrees from the central model neighborhood point and 1 otherwise.  
Hence, tracts within .04 degrees of the model neighborhood central point are coded 1 in all three treatment variables. The time indicator variables, D80, D90, and D00, are 
coded 1 if the data is for the year 1980, 1990, and 2000, respectively, and 0 otherwise.  The interaction terms "D80 x MNa", "D90 x MNa" etc., were calculated by multiplying 
the location indicator variables by the time indicator variables.
Sample, source, and dependent variables are the same as those reported in Table 4a.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Ln 
population






















D80 x MN -0.176 -0.227 0.014 -0.000 -0.017 0.000 0.012 0.025 0.025 -0.035 -0.070 -0.379
(15.32)** (19.41)** (3.67)** (0.01) (6.45)** (0.05) (3.98)** (8.07)** (9.92)** (4.11)** (4.86)** (10.31)**
D90 x MN -0.237 -0.335 0.004 0.006 -0.021 0.002 0.042 0.041 0.027 -0.029 0.031 -0.354
(20.65)** (28.61)** (1.15) (0.99) (7.99)** (0.44) (13.82)** (13.16)** (10.83)** (3.44)** (2.15)* (9.61)**
D00 x MN -0.289 -0.377 -0.014 0.022 -0.024 -0.007 0.058 0.023 0.013 0.013 0.037 -0.345
(25.15)** (32.20)** (3.50)** (3.80)** (9.11)** (1.78) (19.10)** (7.59)** (5.31)** (1.55) (2.60)** (9.39)**
D80 0.019 0.164 0.050 -0.101 -0.008 0.003 0.112 0.023 0.036 0.608 0.921 2.615
(2.03)* (16.97)** (15.63)** (21.37)** (3.68)** (0.74) (44.72)** (8.90)** (17.08)** (86.06)** (77.93)** (77.10)**
D90 0.039 0.227 0.054 -0.153 -0.024 -0.012 0.126 0.038 0.038 1.206 1.576 3.257
(4.07)** (23.51)** (16.99)** (32.33)** (11.30)** (3.54)** (50.26)** (14.99)** (18.23)** (172.15)** (134.44)** (96.06)**
D00 0.075 0.270 0.056 -0.209 -0.026 -0.033 0.167 0.042 0.047 1.568 1.922 3.537
(7.92)** (27.96)** (17.60)** (44.19)** (11.98)** (9.64)** (66.89)** (16.32)** (22.38)** (223.57)** (163.92)** (104.29)**
Constant 8.097 7.002 0.753 0.723 0.209 0.805 0.463 0.160 0.094 9.072 9.733 3.079
(2134.35)** (1809.64)** (593.29)** (385.49)** (246.47)** (587.06)** (463.74)** (158.30)** (112.41)** (3234.74)** (1959.29)** (251.74)**
Observations 22519 22505 22876 22876 22876 22876 22513 22876 22876 22432 20231 19319
Tracts 5701 5692 5719 5719 5719 5719 5701 5719 5719 5690 5511 5681
R-squared 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.26 0.09 0.03 0.59 0.14 0.17 0.92 0.87 0.83
Sample:  Tracts within .1 degrees of the expected central model neighborhood point in 145 of the 150 selected model cities.  Model cities not included in the sample are San 
Juan, Puerto Rico; Alma, Georgia; Prince Georges County, MD; the Gila River Indian Community, AZ; and Los Angeles County, CA.  Los Angeles city is included.  The 
county seats of other counties that received funding were included in the sample.
Table 5a: Comparing Predicted Model Neighborhood Area to Untreated Areas .085-.1 Degrees Away in Nearly All Model Cities
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
"Retention rate" is the proportion of residents five years and older who have lived in the same county for at least five years.  "Work in county" is the proportion of workers 
who work within their county of residence.  "Public transit rate" is the proportion of working persons to travel to work on public transportation.  "High school educated" is 
the proportion of residents twenty-five years and older who have obtained at least a high school education.  "Poverty rate" is the proportion of residents below the poverty 
line.  "Welfare rate" is the proportion of households that received public assistance income in the year prior to the census.  "Avg income" is average total household income 
in the year prior to the census.  "Ln average house value" is the log of the average value of a random sample of owner-occupied non-condo housing units.  "Ln average rent" 
The variable MN is coded 1 if the census tract is within .04 degrees of the predicted central model neighborhood point.  It is coded  0 if the central point of the tract is 
between .085 and .1 degrees from the predicted central model neighborhood point.  The time indicator variables, "D80," "D90," and "D00," are coded 1 if the data is for the 
year 1980, 1990, and 2000, respectively, and 0 otherwise.  The interaction terms "D80 x MN", "D90 x MN" and "D00 x MN" were calculated by multiplying MN by the 
Source:  U.S. Census, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Ln 
population






















D80 x MNa -0.124 -0.153 0.010 -0.002 -0.009 0.002 0.008 0.017 0.015 -0.018 -0.033 -0.368
(14.95)** (17.79)** (3.74)** (0.51) (5.13)** (0.59) (3.65)** (7.99)** (9.10)** (3.09)** (3.29)** (18.22)**
D80 x MNb -0.160 -0.210 0.009 -0.003 -0.018 0.001 0.011 0.026 0.024 -0.040 -0.071 -0.428
(12.16)** (15.35)** (2.21)* (0.41) (6.35)** (0.22) (3.31)** (7.91)** (9.02)** (4.30)** (4.55)** (10.32)**
D80 x MNc -0.208 -0.263 0.024 0.005 -0.014 -0.001 0.014 0.022 0.027 -0.025 -0.069 -0.269
(11.81)** (14.38)** (4.20)** (0.61) (3.77)** (0.23) (3.01)** (5.08)** (7.46)** (2.03)* (3.33)** (4.47)**
D90 x MNa -0.171 -0.223 0.005 0.008 -0.014 0.006 0.029 0.024 0.018 -0.018 0.062 -0.349
(20.64)** (25.91)** (1.81) (2.06)* (7.84)** (2.24)* (13.52)** (11.74)** (10.68)** (3.16)** (6.28)** (17.28)**
D90 x MNb -0.213 -0.314 -0.000 0.000 -0.020 0.002 0.039 0.042 0.028 -0.033 0.034 -0.403
(16.19)** (23.02)** (0.12) (0.05) (7.04)** (0.53) (11.45)** (12.62)** (10.34)** (3.63)** (2.22)* (9.73)**
D90 x MNc -0.286 -0.376 0.014 0.017 -0.022 0.001 0.048 0.039 0.027 -0.020 0.024 -0.241
(16.21)** (20.60)** (2.54)* (1.90) (5.93)** (0.11) (10.51)** (8.74)** (7.39)** (1.66) (1.15) (4.00)**
D00 x MNa -0.211 -0.256 -0.005 0.029 -0.018 -0.000 0.042 0.007 0.006 0.021 0.078 -0.344
(25.38)** (29.69)** (1.80) (7.12)** (10.43)** (0.07) (19.60)** (3.33)** (3.55)** (3.67)** (7.91)** (17.02)**
D00 x MNb -0.263 -0.354 -0.015 0.019 -0.023 -0.006 0.053 0.026 0.014 0.006 0.038 -0.392
(19.97)** (25.90)** (3.60)** (2.91)** (8.03)** (1.31) (15.69)** (7.81)** (5.21)** (0.61) (2.47)* (9.47)**
D00 x MNc -0.341 -0.424 -0.010 0.027 -0.025 -0.011 0.067 0.019 0.012 0.028 0.035 -0.238
(19.36)** (23.20)** (1.73) (3.13)** (6.74)** (1.73) (14.72)** (4.22)** (3.41)** (2.29)* (1.72) (3.95)**
D80 0.336 0.563 0.021 -0.102 0.017 0.002 0.091 -0.017 -0.006 0.656 1.023 3.301
(13.78)** (22.26)** (2.65)** (8.42)** (3.19)** (0.18) (14.50)** (2.86)** (1.12) (38.18)** (35.53)** (42.80)**
D90 0.472 0.806 0.040 -0.173 0.011 -0.020 0.052 -0.026 -0.007 1.249 1.487 3.897
(19.35)** (31.91)** (5.08)** (14.29)** (2.16)* (2.37)* (8.27)** (4.20)** (1.38) (73.26)** (52.10)** (50.55)**
D00 0.602 0.927 0.073 -0.263 0.017 -0.024 0.063 0.014 0.028 1.525 1.808 4.166
(24.67)** (36.68)** (9.25)** (21.76)** (3.33)** (2.87)** (10.02)** (2.27)* (5.64)** (89.41)** (63.35)** (54.03)**
Constant 8.109 7.004 0.757 0.767 0.198 0.801 0.494 0.136 0.077 9.144 9.792 3.002
(3052.91)** (2541.53)** (886.90)** (585.60)** (349.75)** (879.29)** (720.81)** (206.17)** (142.35)** (4915.20)** (3016.43)** (340.58)**
Observations 45147 45105 45792 45792 45792 45792 45140 45792 45792 44963 40905 37851
Tracts 11408 11393 11448 11448 11448 11448 11408 11448 11448 11388 11055 11369
R-squared 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.04 0.57 0.14 0.18 0.93 0.88 0.84
Table 5b: Comparing Predicted Model Neighborhood Area to Untreated Areas .05-.08 Degrees Away in Nearly All Model Cities, in Groups
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
Sample, source, and dependent variables are the same as those reported in Table 5a.
The variable MNa is coded 0 if the central point of the tract is between .04 and .085 degrees and 1 otherwise.  MNb is coded 0 if the tract's central point is between .085 and .095 
degrees from the central model neighborhood point and 1 otherwise.  MNc is coded 0 if the tract's central point is between .095 and .1 degrees from the central model 
neighborhood point and 0 otherwise.  Hence, tracts within .04 degrees of the model neighborhood central point are coded 1 in all three treatment variables. The time indicator 
variables, D80, D90, and D00, are coded 1 if the data is for the year 1980, 1990, and 2000, respectively, and 0 otherwise.  The interaction terms "D80 x MNa", "D90 x MNa" 
etc., were calculated by multiplying the location indicator variables by the time indicator variables.






Difference        
(3) - (2)
Population density (/10,000) 0.484 0.479 0.491 0.011
(0.051) (0.054) (0.097) (0.104)
Number of households (/10,000) 0.318 0.360 0.260 -0.099
(0.027) (0.030) (0.049) (0.055)*
Proportion white 0.815 0.827 0.798 -0.029
(0.017) (0.020) (0.031) (0.036)
High school educated 0.495 0.486 0.506 0.019
(0.011) (0.014) (0.018) (0.023)
Poverty rate 0.143 0.145 0.141 -0.004
(0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.013)
Average income (/10,000) 0.945 0.919 0.980 0.060
(0.015) (0.015) (0.030) (0.031)*
Average house value (/100,000) 0.186 0.186 0.187 0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010)
Average rent (/100) 0.130 0.127 0.134 0.006
(0.013) (0.017) (0.022) (0.027)
Observations 102 55 47
Standard errors reported in parentheses.
Table 6:  City-level Baseline Summary Statistics
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Sources:  1970 U.S. Census; 1968 Uniform Crime Reporting Data; Collins and Margo (2007)
All variables are aggregated tract-level census data, summed by 1998 place code.  "Population density" is total 
population divided by land area, in square miles. "High school educated" is the proportion of residents twenty-
five years and older who have obtained at least a high school education.  "Poverty rate" is the proportion of 
residents below the poverty line.  "Welfare rate" is the proportion of households that received public assistance 
income in the year prior to the census.  "Average income" is average total household income in the year prior to 
the census.  "Average house value" is the average value of a random sample of owner-occupied non-condo 
housing units.  "Average rent" is the average rent for a random sample of housing units where the occupant is 
paying cash rent.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Ln 
population
























D80 x MC -0.050 -0.087 -0.017 -0.018 -0.000 -0.006 0.003 0.016 -0.000 -0.011 -0.089 0.437
(1.31) (2.10)* (1.99)* (1.38) (0.02) (0.66) (0.33) (2.07)* (0.08) (0.48) (1.61) (2.77)**
D90 x MC -0.052 -0.068 -0.024 -0.036 -0.003 -0.020 0.001 0.023 0.004 -0.012 0.014 0.463
(1.36) (1.65) (2.83)** (2.71)** (0.62) (2.25)* (0.06) (3.02)** (0.71) (0.52) (0.26) (2.96)**
D00 x MC -0.069 -0.091 -0.028 -0.036 -0.004 -0.017 -0.009 0.019 0.011 -0.013 -0.030 0.437
(1.81) (2.21)* (3.38)** (2.78)** (0.82) (1.92) (1.01) (2.52)* (2.11)* (0.55) (0.56) (2.79)**
D80 0.025 0.155 0.053 -0.067 -0.019 -0.004 0.122 0.004 0.046 0.633 0.986 2.952
(0.87) (5.04)** (8.56)** (6.91)** (5.05)** (0.58) (18.46)** (0.71) (11.29)** (36.58)** (23.66)** (24.35)**
D90 0.037 0.217 0.045 -0.109 -0.027 -0.024 0.156 0.019 0.041 1.251 1.537 3.571
(1.30) (7.07)** (7.36)** (11.26)** (7.39)** (3.67)** (23.75)** (3.48)** (10.23)** (72.92)** (37.40)** (29.61)**
D00 0.079 0.278 0.040 -0.162 -0.023 -0.053 0.214 0.023 0.044 1.608 1.876 3.872
(2.81)** (9.06)** (6.48)** (16.71)** (6.30)** (8.26)** (32.48)** (4.03)** (10.93)** (93.73)** (45.65)** (32.11)**
Constant 10.870 9.712 0.776 0.818 0.083 0.860 0.491 0.150 0.068 9.111 9.751 2.200
(786.15)** (643.70)** (257.76)** (172.04)** (46.51)** (272.24)** (151.84)** (54.84)** (34.54)** (1078.30)** (480.31)** (36.57)**
Cities 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146
R-squared 0.03 0.26 0.25 0.68 0.28 0.40 0.85 0.22 0.52 0.98 0.93 0.90
Sample:  81 model cities and 65 control group cities.  Cities were selected into the sample based on a propensity score matching system.
Table 7: Effect of Model Cities Program on City-wide Factors, as Compared to Matched Data
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
All variables are aggregated tract-level census data, summed by 1998 place code.  "Population density" is total population divided by land area, in square miles. "High 
The time indicator variables D80, D90, and D00 equal 1 for data points from that census year and 0 if the data is from either of the other years or 1970.  The interaction 
terms "D80 x MC" "D90 x MC" and "D00 x MC" are created by multiplying the time indicator variables by an indicator variable for whether or not the city was selected for 
the Model Cities Program.
Sources:  U.S. Census, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000; 1968 Uniform Crime Reporting Data; Collins and Margo (2007)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Ln 
population
























D80 x MCF 0.647 0.068 -0.825 -0.301 0.037 -0.336 0.362 -0.135 0.050 0.816 0.272 2.985
(0.86) (0.09) (4.48)** (1.01) (0.34) (1.74) (1.82) (0.83) (0.42) (1.63) (0.23) (0.71)
D90 x MCF -0.464 -1.007 -0.755 -0.305 0.009 -0.383 0.350 0.052 0.144 0.401 -0.327 2.302
(0.62) (1.26) (4.09)** (1.02) (0.08) (1.97)* (1.75) (0.32) (1.22) (0.80) (0.27) (0.55)
D00 x MCF -2.029 -2.521 -0.684 -0.304 -0.031 -0.423 0.414 0.177 0.284 0.011 -1.036 1.553
(2.61)** (3.06)** (3.59)** (0.99) (0.27) (2.11)* (2.01)* (1.05) (2.32)* (0.02) (0.84) (0.37)
D80 -0.011 0.124 0.056 -0.073 -0.019 -0.003 0.119 0.014 0.045 0.613 0.931 3.181
(0.57) (5.89)** (11.44)** (9.32)** (6.56)** (0.59) (22.64)** (3.38)** (14.40)** (46.24)** (28.62)** (32.42)**
D90 0.017 0.187 0.043 -0.124 -0.029 -0.029 0.152 0.030 0.041 1.242 1.550 3.825
(0.87) (8.97)** (8.82)** (15.91)** (9.90)** (5.73)** (29.12)** (7.13)** (13.21)** (94.39)** (48.02)** (39.16)**
D00 0.076 0.261 0.033 -0.178 -0.025 -0.056 0.203 0.030 0.045 1.604 1.876 4.122
(3.81)** (12.32)** (6.82)** (22.46)** (8.37)** (10.86)** (38.32)** (6.97)** (14.42)** (120.33)** (57.41)** (41.78)**
MCF -15.715 -14.510 1.288 0.169 -0.394 0.541 -0.029 2.019 0.952 -5.165 -6.728 -12.380
(9.98)** (8.69)** (3.33)** (0.27) (1.70) (1.33) (0.07) (5.93)** (3.83)** (4.91)** (2.76)** (1.57)
Constant 11.258 10.103 0.753 0.817 0.093 0.851 0.487 0.101 0.043 9.234 9.924 2.462
(296.21)** (250.76)** (80.74)** (54.20)** (16.58)** (86.88)** (48.29)** (12.29)** (7.19)** (362.98)** (163.41)** (13.27)**
Cities 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146
R-squared 0.25 0.40 0.27 0.67 0.29 0.41 0.86 0.29 0.55 0.98 0.93 0.90
Sample:  81 model cities and 65 control group cities.  Cities were selected into the sample based on a propensity score matching system.
Table 8: Effect of Model Cities Program Funds per Capita on City-wide Factors, as Compared to Matched Data
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
All variables are aggregated tract-level census data, summed by 1998 place code.  "Population density" is total population divided by land area, in square miles. "High school 
educated" is the proportion of residents twenty-five years and older who have obtained at least a high school education.  "Poverty rate" is the proportion of residents below 
the poverty line.  "Welfare rate" is the proportion of households that received public assistance income in the year prior to the census.  "Average income" is average total 
household income in the year prior to the census.  "Average house value" is the average value of a random sample of owner-occupied non-condo housing units.  "Average 
rent" is the average rent for a random sample of housing units where the occupant is paying cash rent.
The time indicator variables D80 D90 and D00 equal 1 for data points from that census year and 0 if the data point is from either of the other years or 1970.  MCF is total 
funding, in thousands of dollars, approved for the city's Model Cities program in 1971 divided by the total city population, where the total city population is aggregated tract-
level population data.  The interaction terms "D80 x MCF" "D90 x MCF" and "D00 x MCF" are created by multiplying the time indicator variables by "MCF."
Sources:  U.S. Census, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000; 1968 Uniform Crime Reporting Data; Collins and Margo (2007)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
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D80 x MN x MC 0.231 0.228 0.017 0.028 -0.022 -0.009 -0.005 0.005 0.008 -0.061 -0.112 -0.374
(3.46)** (3.25)** (0.65) (1.69) (1.58) (0.87) (0.28) (0.32) (0.68) (1.32) (1.52) (1.51)
D90 x MN x MC 0.249 0.245 0.007 0.044 -0.004 -0.007 -0.011 0.008 0.013 -0.051 -0.076 -0.404
(3.73)** (3.50)** (0.28) (2.68)** (0.28) (0.69) (0.69) (0.47) (1.11) (1.12) (1.03) (1.63)
D00 x MN x MC 0.207 0.249 -0.001 0.024 -0.022 -0.007 0.005 0.016 0.006 -0.096 -0.210 -0.459
(3.11)** (3.53)** (0.04) (1.43) (1.56) (0.73) (0.32) (0.98) (0.53) (2.12)* (2.87)** (1.85)
D80 x MN -0.591 -0.700 -0.035 -0.036 0.012 -0.023 0.040 0.021 0.032 0.016 -0.072 -0.134
(11.95)** (13.46)** (1.85) (2.92)** (1.14) (3.06)** (3.24)** (1.71) (3.57)** (0.48) (1.34) (0.79)
D90 x MN -0.775 -0.973 -0.045 -0.084 -0.017 -0.027 0.092 0.023 0.031 0.081 0.243 0.014
(15.66)** (18.70)** (2.36)* (6.85)** (1.62) (3.56)** (7.54)** (1.96) (3.48)** (2.41)* (4.55)** (0.09)
D00 x MN -0.855 -1.113 -0.025 -0.098 -0.013 -0.022 0.103 0.014 0.028 0.152 0.252 0.013
(17.30)** (21.31)** (1.31) (7.95)** (1.21) (2.87)** (8.44)** (1.20) (3.15)** (4.48)** (4.71)** (0.08)
D80 x MC -0.229 -0.212 -0.024 -0.032 0.024 0.008 0.014 0.017 0.003 0.012 0.005 0.252
(3.62)** (3.19)** (0.99) (2.06)* (1.83) (0.86) (0.89) (1.12) (0.28) (0.27) (0.07) (1.03)
D90 x MC -0.237 -0.192 -0.016 -0.068 -0.007 0.005 0.031 0.009 -0.004 0.038 0.147 0.329
(3.75)** (2.88)** (0.65) (4.34)** (0.54) (0.56) (1.98)* (0.56) (0.33) (0.88) (2.11)* (1.36)
D00 x MC -0.213 -0.215 -0.020 -0.060 0.008 0.004 0.016 -0.001 0.001 0.081 0.211 0.348
(3.37)** (3.22)** (0.82) (3.78)** (0.57) (0.42) (1.01) (0.08) (0.05) (1.88) (3.04)** (1.43)
D80 0.492 0.690 -0.060 0.085 -0.023 0.002 0.069 -0.005 0.014 0.607 0.989 2.797
(10.64)** (14.20)** (3.34)** (7.40)** (2.34)* (0.27) (6.05)** (0.41) (1.63) (18.98)** (19.67)** (17.07)**
D90 0.648 0.913 -0.119 0.134 -0.015 -0.005 0.048 0.025 0.020 1.107 1.272 3.268
(14.02)** (18.77)** (6.63)** (11.63)** (1.56) (0.68) (4.23)** (2.26)* (2.36)* (35.13)** (25.44)** (20.08)**
D00 0.735 1.064 -0.189 0.141 -0.045 -0.004 0.082 0.037 0.035 1.400 1.566 3.557
(15.90)** (21.77)** (10.56)** (12.24)** (4.66)** (0.59) (7.22)** (3.26)** (4.23)** (44.18)** (31.31)** (21.69)**
Constant 8.083 6.986 0.794 0.767 0.886 0.100 0.466 0.173 0.084 9.026 9.648 2.774
(1223.71)** (1004.32)** (310.59)** (466.67)** (640.10)** (100.39)** (286.16)** (108.21)** (70.23)** (2002.48)** (1323.06)** (141.31)**
Observations 6759 6753 6776 6776 6776 6776 6759 6776 6776 6720 6540 5855
Tracts 1691 1692 1694 1694 1694 1694 1691 1694 1694 1691 1678 1690
R-squared 0.12 0.16 0.46 0.12 0.22 0.10 0.60 0.16 0.27 0.93 0.89 0.86
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
Sources and dependent variables are the same as those described in Table 8.  MC is the same as described in Table 7.
MN=1 if the tract's central point is within .04 degrees of the estimated central point of the predicted model neighborhood, whether or not the city was granted Model Cities funding.  
MN=0 if the central point of the tract is between .085 and .1 degrees from the estimated central point of the predicted model neighborhood.
Sample: 2331 tracts from 65 model cities and 1362 tracts from 48 comparison group cities.  Cities were selected into the sample based on the propensity score matching system 
described in section 10.
Table 9: Difference in Changes between Model Cities and Matched Controls between likely Model Neighborhoods and Areas .085-.1 Degrees Away
Source:  Rosenfeld, Raymond A. 1979. "Local Implementation Decisions for Community Development Block Grants." Public Administration Review , 
39(5).
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Sources:  U.S. Census, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000; 1968 Uniform Crime Reporting Data; Collins and Margo (2007)
Propensity scores are calculated by the model described in Section 10.
Sources:  U.S. Census, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000; 1968 Uniform Crime Reporting Data; Collins and Margo (2007)
Figure 3:  Propensity Score Distribution of Untrimmed Sample
Sample:  145 model cities and 3,727 potential comparison group cities.
Propensity scores are calculated by the model described in Section 10.
Figure 4:  Propensity Score Distribution of Trimmed Sample
Sample:  81 model cities and 65 comparison group cities.
